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Satire, Social Identity, and Classical Tradition: *Paideia* in Lucian

Lynn Gallogly

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Introduction

This thesis deals with the representation of *paideia* in Lucian, which I approach as a focused snapshot of a broad and complex topic. Education, culture, and identity are highly charged terms in any context, but certainly in the Greek literary period that is known to modern scholars as the Second Sophistic. My aim is to offer an interpretation of a selection of Lucian's works based on a close reading that is informed by the historical context of the Second Sophistic.

I will begin with a brief explanation of the terms which underlie my inquiry. The Greek word *paideia* (παίδεια) translates most simply as “education,” the process by which a child (*pais*) is brought up and trained. For the ancient Greeks, however, *paideia* came to imply not just education in general, but the accumulation of a certain body of knowledge and its associated values embedded within Greek culture. By the time in which Lucian is writing, *paideia* also has the meaning of “culture,” the quality or state of learnedness that is derived from education.¹ We can therefore also understand *paideia* as part of “culture” in a different sense, that is, as part of what ancient Greek-speaking peoples could use to define what it meant to be Greek.

These sound like sweeping generalizations, but they have particular relevance for the time on which I have chosen to focus. The “Second Sophistic” is a modern description used for the period of Imperial Greek literature from approximately 50 to 250 CE. The phrase was originally coined by Flavius Philostratus in his biographical collection, *Lives of the Sophists* (c. 230 CE), to distinguish between two styles of Greek oratory, an older, “first sophistic,” and a “second sophistic,” founded by Aeschines in the fourth century BCE (Phil. 481). Most of the orators of this second style described by Philostratus come from the Roman period, and hence modern scholarship has appropriated the term for the Greek sophists of the early to mid Roman Empire in particular. More recently, it has come to refer loosely to Greek imperial literature

¹ Marrou (1956) observes that *paideia* is translated by some Latin authors as *humanitas*.

regardless of its connection to rhetoric. As Tim Whitmarsh has noted, the choice of the term “Second Sophistic” has important ramifications for how this period and the literature included in it are conceptualized. For one, it emphasizes the “secondness” of this literature, its awareness of coming later in a tradition and of being in a constant relationship with previous texts.² This distinction is both modern and ancient: not only has there been a tendency in recent times to read the literature of the Second Sophistic in comparison with earlier and better studied Greek literature, especially the classical age of the fourth and fifth centuries BCE, but the writers of the Second Sophistic were always consciously looking backward to those earlier examples. In addition, the word “sophistic” is a reminder of the continued importance of rhetoric in Greek intellectual culture of this time period.³ Although “Second Sophistic” as it is typically used now includes a range of literary genres, orators and the performance of oratory have a prominent role in the Second Sophistic that is important for our understanding of it.

Paideia is a crucial element for both halves of the “Second Sophistic.” The referential or derivative nature of its literature results from both a continuing education tradition in the Greek-speaking world and the historical circumstances in which Greeks of this period were living. By the middle of the first century, the Greeks had had a cultural presence in the eastern Mediterranean for hundreds of years, both in the city-states of the Greek mainland and in other regions colonized by them or where Hellenizing influences had been spread by the conquest of Alexander the Great. However, all of this region was now firmly under the control of the Roman Empire, which meant that not only did Greek cities lack the political autonomy they had enjoyed

² Whitmarsh 2001, 44-5.

³ Note on the word “sophist”. I use a number of terms to talk about public speaking and those who practiced it, including rhetoric, oratory, orators, and sophists. All of these terms have a range of connotations in both ancient and modern usage. Rhetoric and oratory (from Greek and Latin roots, respectively) are sometimes distinguished as denoting the theoretical and performance aspects of public speaking, but it was not clear that there was any hard and fast distinction in antiquity, and I use these terms interchangeably. The word “sophist” often has a negative connotation in ancient times; this may have shifted by the Second Sophistic, although there is still a connection between “sophist” and epideictic oratory. See Gunderson 2009 for further discussion of these terms.

in the classical period, but they also had to contend with the domination of a powerful non-Greek entity. It is perhaps not surprising that this period is marked by a tendency to focus on the past, politically independent era of the Greek world to the exclusion of the present. Bowie has noted the prevalence of archaizing among both orators and historians, who consistently ignore or skim over events after 323 BCE. A preference for classically-influenced themes and models, as well as the use of classical Attic for literary texts, create a picture of a society whose intellectuals, despite whatever political connections they may have had in the Roman system, were determined to assert their Greek identity.⁴

It is more useful to see this backward-looking tendency not as a sudden shift but as a logical procession of pre-existing ideas and practices of *paideia* in the Greek-speaking world. From Hellenistic times traditional education for elite classes had emphasized the reading of a canonical selection of texts, mainly from the classical period, and education in rhetoric, particularly, was based upon the imitation of specific models and set forms drawn from classical examples.⁵ This not only produced orators who naturally chose subjects from classical texts, it also reinforced a mindset that privileged an authoritative original source and promoted emulation of it as the highest form of learning. Added to this was a tradition, which had emerged in the first century BCE, of using the Attic dialect of classical Athens as the language of literature and elite intellectual communication, even though commonly spoken forms of Greek had changed considerably since the fourth century BCE even among the upper classes.⁶ Thus *paideia* already consisted of a package of practices and values with both an archaizing inclination and a characteristically “Greek” flavor.

⁴ Bowie 1970.

⁵ Marrou 1956.

⁶ Swain 1996.

Nevertheless, it is clear that these aspects of *paideia* had particular significance for writers and intellectuals of the Second Sophistic, whom we might more accurately refer to as *pepaideumenoi* (singular *pepaideumenos*), those who have acquired *paideia*. Much insightful work has been done to explore the ways in which Greeks in the Second Sophistic negotiated their identities and literary voices *vis-à-vis* Roman domination. It is beyond the scope of this paper to do justice to most of this, but I am taking a number of theoretical assumptions and influences from this scholarship. First, I follow especially Whitmarsh and Goldhill in seeing labels such as “Greek” and “Roman” not as outward expressions of innate qualities, but as identities that were constantly being constructed and defined by the individuals and groups that used them, through multiple means including literature. While distinct ethnic identities certainly existed, it is important to remember that in an empire where travel and exchange had become increasingly common, shifting linguistic and cultural boundaries overlapped to create complex identities that might be expressed differently by different individuals. *Paideia* works with that in the sense that it is both an expression of an established cultural identity (what it means to be Greek), and a means of constructing it (one becomes truly Greek by acquiring *paideia*). In that way *paideia* transcends, or has the potential to transcend, ethnic lines; and indeed several important figures of the Second Sophistic, including Lucian, were not ethnically Greek, but were able to participate in the Greek intellectual world through their *paideia*.

Recent scholarship has also illuminated something else that is significant for my inquiry, which is that *paideia* mediated not only cultural identity but social class and status. Education was a business of the elite, and so also one of the ways in which they displayed their status. Swain has addressed the political dimension of the practice of Atticism, which set the

pepaideumenoi linguistically apart and above the rest of the population.⁷ Gleason and Whitmarsh more fully explore how *paideia* is used to construct the elite Greek-speaking (male) subject.⁸ Because *paideia* was the province of a select few, displaying that one has *paideia* is a way of claiming elite status as well as a cultural connection to the revered past. *Display* is an important concept here which also brings in the emphasis on oratory, for the public performance of oratory was the primary arena for individuals to showcase their *paideia*. Public speeches had long been an important part of Greek civic life, but the Second Sophistic saw a proliferation of professional orators who travelled throughout the empire performing before audiences for money, often in competition with other orators.⁹ Their services might also be used in a civic context, and oratory was necessary for law courts, although this was often considered separate from the realm of professional sophists. In these performances the prominence fell on epideictic rhetoric, or speeches on set themes that served to display the eloquence of the speaker.

The significance of this kind of performance cannot be overstated, although it is difficult for modern readers to fully grasp this when the words that would have been declaimed aloud come to us on a page, disconnected from the individual speakers who would have performed them. As Gleason has noted, although *paideia* was acquired primarily through mastery of literacy, it had to be displayed orally; furthermore, the status of *pepaideumenos*, once achieved, was not something that could be taken for granted, but had to be constantly asserted and proven in public and face-to-face interactions.¹⁰ What this means is that *paideia*, on the one hand, constitutes a package of knowledge and skills that is generally common to all who have it. A declaimer draws from this knowledge to build speeches (or a writer to compose literary texts),

⁷ Swain 1996, 17-41.

⁸ Gleason 1995; Whitmarsh 2001, 2005.

⁹ Gunderson 2009.

¹⁰ Gleason 1995, xxi-xxiv.

and the *pepaideumenoi* in his audience will be able to notice a clever literary reference or judge the fluency of his Attic Greek. At the same time, *paideia* is constantly being constructed and enacted by those who practice it in this display of performance, as they rework traditional themes and compete with other *pepaideumenoi* for prowess and renown.

On a practical level, what might education in the Second Sophistic actually involve? First, the study of literature: the “classical canon” of *paideia* seems to have exalted Homer especially, but textual references suggest that many other authors were read, including lyric poets such as Sappho and Pindar, Euripides, Sophocles, Aeschylus, Menander, Aristophanes, Demosthenes, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Herodotus.¹¹ Quotations, references, and echoes from many of these authors appear in Lucian, who was clearly widely read. For rhetorical training, students would practice preliminary exercises called *progymnasmata* that were intended to equip them with a set of skills and devices that would be useful in the composition of a speech. In *progymnasmata* all potential aspects of a speech were broken down systematically for the student to practice in turn: among other things, an aspiring orator would learn how to tell a simple story multiple ways, to compose standard formulas of praise and blame, and argue for or against a simple theoretical proposition. The examples on which they practiced would typically come from historical or mythological stories that were widely known and re-used. For example, a second-century handbook on rhetoric by Hermogenes takes the legend of Medea through a series of narrative variations; common questions for debate might also include episodes from the Trojan War or historical events from the history of Athens. When it came time for an orator to compose a speech, he would have standard list of examples to draw from, which could easily be fitted into one of the customary forms. Professional sophists were expected to improvise speeches using these tools; in competitions, often in response to suggestion from the audience.

¹¹ For a complete survey of educational practices see Marrou 1956.

What they said might be written down afterwards or possibly beforehand and memorized, but never read in performance. In this aspect of rhetoric there is a certain amount of tension between tradition and innovation. All orators might use the same formulas, but a true test of their skill was whether they could spontaneously craft something within these confines that would entertain an audience.¹²

Paideia in the Second Sophistic thus presents an array of complex issues to tackle. More than simply “education,” *paideia* in this period is a vehicle for both the performance and the construction of cultural identity and social status, processes which are enacted in the public sphere of oratory as well as in the writing of literature. It offers an articulation of what it means to be Greek in a Roman world, largely through an almost obsessively persistent connection with the past. As writers such as Whitmarsh and Goldhill have discussed, however, none of this is necessarily simple or straightforward; the literature of the Second Sophistic grapples with questions that the peculiar cultural position of Greeks in the Roman world provoked. Their focus on the glory days of Greece, for example, might bring the present closer to the past, but it also risked exposing the gap between past and present. An insistence on purity of language and a classics-based standard in elite education might create a unified culture, but it could also run up against the reality that the world in which they were living encompassed a hybrid mixture of cultures.

In the midst of this muddle comes Lucian of Samosata. Virtually nothing is known about Lucian outside of his works; the primary external evidence for his existence is an uncomplimentary entry in the tenth-century *Suda* (λ 683), and a brief mention in the writings of Galen which survive in Arabic. He is not mentioned in Philostratus’ *Lives of the Sophists*, which

¹² See Anderson 1993, 47-68 for an overview of sophistic training and practice, and Whitmarsh 2001 for an overview of sophistic performance.

includes many other figures from the Second Sophistic. Based on internal evidence from his texts, it has been suggested that Lucian was born between 115 and 125 CE, which would date his writings to the mid to late second century.¹³ He mentions in one text that his native city is Samosata, located on the west bank of the Euphrates in modern-day Syria. Lucian frequently refers to himself, or to a figure that may represent him, as “Syrian,” “Assyrian,” or “barbarian” (βάρβαρος), and a work sometimes attributed to him describes a temple to the Syrian goddess Atargatis in city of Hierapolis Bambyce.¹⁴ Exactly how “Syrian” Lucian really was is impossible to say. Samosata was the capital of the kingdom of Commagene, ruled by a mixed Iranian-Greek dynasty until its absorption into the Roman Empire in 72 CE. By Lucian’s time this region would have long been influenced by Greek culture, at least among the upper classes.

However, as Swain points out, just across the river from Samosata was the Semitic kingdom of Osroene, which in the subsequent centuries would be the site of the rise of the Aramaic language and the Syriac Christian church in opposition to the prevailing imperial forms of language and religion.¹⁵ It is possible that Lucian’s first language was Aramaic, and that his ethnicity barred him from full inclusion into the society of Greek *pepaideumenoi*; he is certainly inclined to represent himself as a foreigner. Whatever the exact details were, the crucial point is that Lucian originated from a place on the margins of the Greek-speaking world. His position in that world thus depends upon the learned acquisition of culture, on his *paideia*.

This mysterious character thus makes for an intriguing object of investigation, as does his work, which is difficult to categorize. He has a large corpus, most of which might be described as satire: he makes fun of historians, courtesans, philosophers, even the gods. Some of it even uses fantastical elements, almost like an early precursor of science fiction. It is likely that Lucian

¹³ Swain 1996, 298.

¹⁴ Swain 1996, 304.

¹⁵ Swain 1996, 299.

wrote primarily for a performance context; he has a particular fondness for *prolaliai* (introductions that orators might use to set up a longer speech, but which in Lucian often seem to stand alone) as well as comic dialogues.¹⁶ Like a proper *pepaideumenos*, he draws on a wide range of classical literary references, themes and subjects, delivered in pitch-perfect Attic Greek, although he reworks them in clever and subversive ways. This reworking is essential to what makes Lucian's pieces comic, as Branham has shown.¹⁷ For the purpose of the present discussion, it is also central to understanding the ways in which Lucian represents *paideia*.

Paideia is an interesting lens through which to explore Lucian because it encapsulates many of the complex issues of the Second Sophistic and the literary figure of Lucian that I have just summarized. Lucian lived and wrote in a world in which education had enormous cultural and social significance, and his primary, perhaps only, connection to that world was through his education and the display of its results. How he will then choose to represent *paideia* within his texts is therefore certainly not inconsequential, and Lucian seems well aware of this. Indeed, his works show an awareness of the process of composing and performing, as well as of his audience, his self-presentation, and social context in which his presentation would have been received. My analysis does not attempt to hypothesize specific historical references or connections from the text; rather, I focus on a close reading of three texts, *Somnium*, *Rhetorum Praeceptor*, and *Bis Accusatus*, that is informed by the historical and theoretical background referenced in this introduction.

In the first chapter I discuss *Somnium*, a short piece in which the narrator describes a dream that led him to choose a career founded on *paideia* rather than training as a sculptor. The choice portrayed by the dream is personified by two female figures, *Paideia* and *Sculpture*,

¹⁶ Nesselrath 1990.

¹⁷ Branham 1989.

between whom the narrator must decide, which invokes a well-established motif in Greek literature. Lucian subversively reworks this motif and other classical references to craft a piece that is both a satire of *paideia* and an exposition of it.

My second chapter looks at *Rhetorum Praeceptor*, a satirical invective that uses an instructional guide for the education of a professional orator in order to lampoon the inept practice of oratory. In this chapter, I discuss how Lucian uses this satirical representation of a bad practice of oratory to raise problematic issues about rhetorical performance in general.

Finally, my third chapter focuses on *Bis Accusatus*, a comic dialogue in which a host of improbable characters are brought to trial, including a figure called the “Syrian” who has meddled with practices related to *paideia*. This piece brings up many issues related to Lucian’s precarious position as a foreigner who is also a *pepaideumenos*, giving him the opportunity to defend his *paideia* under “trial.” This chapter postulates how Lucian manipulates the implications of his status and his unorthodox literary style so that they work to his advantage.

The narrow scope of this thesis cannot account for every facet of Lucian’s work and its relationship to *paideia* and the Second Sophistic. Nevertheless, even these three texts alone raise many intriguing questions, some of which I will attempt to address in the pages that follow. Lucian’s texts prompt his audience to reconsider the role of *paideia* as a connection between past and present, as well as its significance as a marker of status, and to wonder whether or not social mobility is possible through education. For all of these questions he offers no straightforward answers, but instead requires us to find our way through a maze where nothing is ever quite as it seems.

Chapter 1

I will begin my inquiry into the depiction of *paideia* in Lucian with a short work called *Somnium* (The Dream). In this piece, Lucian represents *paideia*, in his typical fashion, not just thematically but literally, as an embodied figure.

At the beginning of *Somnium*, the speaker tells us that when he was a young boy, just finished with the rudiments of education, his father considered what kind of career to train him for. The father decides that any further *paideia* would be too costly and time-consuming, and overly ambitious for someone of his family's rank. Instead, the speaker is apprenticed to his uncle, a sculptor of statues (ἐρμολύφος), with the hope that a youthful talent for sculpting figures out of the wax from his school tablets will give him an aptitude for this trade. On his first day, however, the speaker bungles his first strike on a block of stone and is beaten by his uncle. He runs home crying with pain and wounded pride, and that night he has a strange dream. In this dream, two women come to him, each one trying to persuade him to follow her path: squalid, mannish *Hermogluphike Techne* – a personification of the sculptor's craft he has just begun to learn – and elegant, composed *Paideia*, an embodiment of the education he had rejected. Each one gives a speech describing the benefits she has to offer him. The speaker quickly chooses *Paideia*, and rides away with her in a flying chariot, rising to the glorious heights of fame.

At first glance, the *Somnium* appears to be simply a story of the speaker's career, and many have read it like this as a reference for Lucian's own life. Leaving aside biographical speculations, the piece still functions as an exposition of the speaker's *paideia*, literally because it explains how he acquired it, but also implicitly through Lucian's use of certain motifs and references to classical literature. The speaker introduces the account of his dream with a direct quotation from Book Two of the *Iliad*, when Agamemnon is recounting a dream: θεῖός μοι

ἐνύπνιον ἦλθεν ὄνειρος ἀμβροσίην διὰ νύκτα (a god-sent dream came to me as a vision in sleep through the ambrosial night) (5) (cf. *Iliad* II.56-7). By opening with this quotation, he demonstrates familiarity with Homer, and more importantly, he promotes his story as coming from a tradition where inspiration from a dream has a legitimate precedent. With regard to the dream itself, the choice between two allegorical figures which represent contrasting ideas recalls Prodicus' fable of the choice of Heracles, as told by Socrates in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.21-34). This reference again serves both to demonstrate the speaker's *paideia* and to give his story a respectable precedent. It may be an exaggeration to say that the speaker is implying a link between himself and the hero Heracles, but by choosing to tell his story with that motif, he prompts his audience to consider the possibility. The speaker's implied claim to illustrious status extends further, because his choosing between *Paideia* and *Sculpture* associates him with Socrates, who was said to have abandoned a career as a sculptor when he took up philosophy. *Paideia* even mentions this in her speech:

ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τῇ Ἑρμογλυφικῇ ταύτῃ τραφεῖς, ἐπειδὴ τάχιστα
 συνῆκεν τοῦ κρείττονος καὶ δραπετεύσας παρ' αὐτῆς ἠὲ τομόλησεν ὡς ἐμέ,
 ἀκούεις ὡς παρὰ πάντων ἄδεται
 Socrates himself was reared by that Sculpture, but he quickly perceived who was
 better and, running away from her, he came to me – you hear how he is sung by all
 (12).¹⁸

An educated audience would notice these references, and so by including them, Lucian establishes a context for his speaker and the speaker's audience in terms of their relation to *paideia*. The speaker demonstrates that he is an educated person who is familiar with classical texts and can incorporate them in his own story; accordingly, he expects his audience to be educated enough to spot his references.

¹⁸ All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

However, it quickly becomes clear that Lucian is manipulating the conventions with which he purported to start. The more the speaker tries to proclaim his *paideia*, the more he undermines the account of his career and claim to *paideia*, and even raises doubts about the nature of *paideia* itself. But once he has brought us to that point of doubting him, we also see that he is a master of his *paideia* all along, and has been using it to construct this manipulation.

As Deborah Gera has noted, many later writers also draw on the choice of Heracles, either retelling the fable or reworking it with a different pair of figures, as Lucian does.¹⁹ In her study of a range of these examples, however, Gera finds that Lucian's approach to the "choice" allegory has some unusual twists, particularly in the way he depicts the figures themselves. In Xenophon's version, Heracles encounters two women at a crossroads, Arete (Virtue) and Kakia (Vice), who each try to persuade him to follow their path. Both Vice and Virtue are attractive, but Virtue is modest and understated, while Vice attempts to be seductive with artificial adornment. Most other writers follow this pattern by making the positive figure modest or even unattractive, and the negative figure artificially beautiful in a way that suggests a false appearance.²⁰ This, as Gera points out, makes sense for the moral dimension of the fable: if the negative figure did not at least appear to be an appealing choice, there would be nothing at stake in making the right decision.²¹ Yet Lucian's *Techne* is unmistakably ugly, and his choice to go with *Paideia* is evidently based on her more attractive appearance. He has disrupted the conventions on which this motif should rest if it intends to have a moralizing message. However simple the story told in *Somnium* may seem, then, it is not meant to be a fable in the same way.

If we do not read the speaker's choice between *Techne* and *Paideia* as a simple one between the "virtuous" way and the "wicked" way, what exactly is at stake in his decision? What

¹⁹ Gera 1995, 239.

²⁰ Gera 1995, 242-243.

²¹ Gera 1995, 243.

are we to make of this as a defense of his *paideia*? I propose that there are two persistent themes in the text that are important for understanding how Lucian has reworked the choice allegory, and how he uses it to comment on *paideia*. The first is appearance and presentation. The *Somnium* is fixated on the physical appearance, dress, and adornment of its characters, and also on the acts of showing, seeing, and being seen. The second, closely linked to this, is a distinction between speech and physical deeds and works created (or rather, sculpted) by the hands.

The description that introduces the figure of Tekhne resembles that of a laborer who has just come from a hard day's toil in her shop: her appearance is squalid (αὐχμηρὰ), her hands are calloused (τῷ χεῖρῃ τύλων ἀνάπλεως), her clothes are girded up for work (διεζωσμένη τὴν ἐσθῆτα), and she is covered in chalk (τιτάνου καταγέμουσα) (6). She is, in effect, the sort of person who gives little of her attention to her physical appearance, because all of it is directed toward her craft. Tekhne herself seems concerned that her poor appearance may count against her, for she urges the speaker not to take heed of it: μὴ μυσαχθῆς δὲ τοῦ σχήματος τὸ εὐτελὲς μηδὲ τῆς ἐσθῆτος τὸ πιναρὸν (Do not loath the meanness of my appearance nor the squalor of my clothes) (8). By trying to excuse her own appearance, she acknowledges that looks will count for something in this choice, and reinforces the implication of a workman's dusty appearance as negative.

The first description of Paideia is the opposite of Tekhne's disarray: she is fair of face (εὐπρόσωπος), comely in form (τὸ σχῆμα εὐπρεπῆς), and has neatly-arranged clothing (κόσμιος τὴν ἀναβολήν) (6). Later, she indicates she is wearing "illustrious" finery (πάνυ δὲ λαμπρὰν ἐφόρει) (11). From the very beginning the contrast between the two possible choices is constructed on the basis of appearance, and we are meant to see Paideia's attractive, orderly figure as the more positive of the two. But this fixation on appearance continues to show

up even in unexpected places. In Paideia's speech, she describes the virtues and skills she will offer the speaker with particular reference to appearance. By exposing him to the words and deeds of great men, Paideia says that she will *ornament* his soul with many good decorations (τὴν ψυχὴν ... κατακοσμήσω πολλοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς κοσμήμασι) (10). She lists all the attributes which the wise and noble seek – intelligence, piety, love of beauty, and so forth – but she does not say, as one might expect, that his soul will possess these virtues, but that it will be adorned by them (κατακοσμήσω), and lest there be any mistaking the choice of the word, she emphasizes again that these are ornaments or decorations (κοσμήμασι). It is as though the soul were a figure that needed to be clothed, and that it was first and foremost necessary that this arraignment be composed of the most seemly parts. The process of becoming a *pepaideumenos* has blurred with the process of arranging one's physical appearance.

This connection becomes more explicit as Paideia's speech continues. She promises the speaker that if he follows her he will wear fine clothes like hers, interrupting her speech briefly to point them out: 'ἐσθῆτα μὲν τοιαύτην ἀμπεχόμενος,' δείξασα τὴν ἑαυτῆς ("having this sort of clothing," indicating her own) (11). When the speaker does choose Paideia, she takes him in a chariot ride across the sky to show him his future as a *pepaideumenos*. At the end of this, the boy finds that he is indeed wearing fine clothes unlike those he had worn before, a garment with a purple border, and he shows these off with pride to his father and others at home

οὐκέτι τὴν αὐτὴν ἐσθῆτα ἐκείνην ἐνδεδυκότα ἦν εἶχον ἀφιπτάμενος, ἀλλὰ μοι
ἐδόκουν εὐπάρυφός τις ἐπανήκειν, καταλαβοῦσα οὖν καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἐστῶτα
καὶ περιμένοντα ἐδείκνυεν αὐτῷ ἐκείνη τὴν ἐσθῆτα καμέ

[She brought me back] no longer wearing that same clothing which I had had when I
flew off, but rather it seemed to me that some purple-bordered garment returned
[with me], and finding my father standing and waiting she showed him the clothing
and me (16).

His transformation by *paideia* is symbolized through his change of clothes, which everyone can see and admire. It is, indeed, the only thing that seems to have changed, for no mention is made of what he has learned, as if all one really had to do to become educated was to put on a fancy purple robe. Meanwhile, grubby Tekhne, rejected for her prettier rival, gnashes her teeth in fury, but presently turns inexplicably to stone. She has passed into the medium of her work, and the speaker has passed, with Paideia, into higher realms.

This link between *paideia* and adornment shows how Lucian is further confusing the poles upon which his choice is supposed to depend. There is an ugly Tekhne whose negative portrayal marks her as the “wrong” choice, and an attractive Paideia who is then supposed to be the “right” choice. However, by blatantly associated Paideia with clothing and ornamentation, he implies that both her appeal to the speaker and the transformation she offers are purely cosmetic, something that seems good on the outside but is empty on the inside, rather more like Prodicus’ superficially attractive Vice. This throws the nature of his choice into doubt: is Paideia the “good” one or the “bad” one? As Gera observed through her analysis of similar stories, Lucian presentation of the two figures makes this distinction ambiguous. Now we may also begin to doubt the nature of *paideia* in general. Is he implying that *paideia* is primarily a matter of what a person wears, and not the learning they have acquired, as one would naturally expect? Do the clothes, then, make the man?

Even beyond physical adornment, *Somnium* is preoccupied with the act of presentation, of how one is viewed by others. Throughout the text, words of showing and displaying (φαίνομαι, δείκνυμι) are significant in constructing identity. Even before the speaker has his dream, his only concern as he prepares to learn sculpture is how his friends will be impressed: εἰ φαινοίμην θεοὺς τε γλύφω καὶ ἀγαλμάτια μικρὰ τινα κατασκευάζων ἑμαυτῷ τε καὶ κείνοις

οἷς προηροῦμην (if I might appear to be carving gods and making some small statues for myself and for those whom I preferred) (3). He wants to be able to display his new skills and be admired for them, because this will affirm his new identity as a sculptor. When Tekhne and Paideia mention each other in their speeches, both also point out the other (δείξασα τὴν ἑτέραν), clearly directing the speaker's gaze from one to the other so that he will notice the contrast between them. Since the identity of each figure is defined as the antithesis of the other, the emphasis of this contrast is notable. Paideia shows (ἐδείκνυεν) the newly-educated and finely-dressed speaker to his father, thereby confirming his new identity (16). Also important are words referring to praise (ἐπαινῶ), which occur as a reaction to seeing what is impressive or noteworthy, and add to the importance of the gaze. As the speaker rides across the sky in Paideia's flying chariot, he receives praise from spectators below, who are apparently impressed by his *paideia*, or simply his appearance, for no distinction is made. He recalls that he scattered something – perhaps to represent speeches or other displays of learning – but he cannot remember what it was:

οὐκέτι μέντοι μέμνημαι ὅ τι τὸ σπειρόμενον ἐκεῖνο ἦν, πλὴν τοῦτο μόνον ὅτι
κάτωθεν ἀφορῶντες ἄνθρωποι ἐπῆνουν καὶ μετ' εὐφημίας καθ' οὓς γενοίμην
τῇ πτήσει παρόπεμπον

Indeed, I no longer remember what the thing scatter was, but only this: men
watching from below were praising me and, with praises from those whom I passed
in flight, they sent me on my way (15).

The aspect of the experience he can clearly recall is the praise directed toward him, which implies this is what creates his new status as a *pepaideumos*. The nature of the speaker's transformation suggests that in the terms of this text, the gaze of others and their approval of one's appearance are the means by which identity is constructed. It matters what you look like, and how other people see you, because that is how you know who you are.

With so much importance placed on presentation, there are some interesting gaps in the speaker's presentation of himself and his recollections. He first claims that his recollection of this dream is as vivid as if it had just happened:

ἔτι γοῦν καὶ μετὰ τοσοῦτον χρόνον τὰ τε σχήματά μοι τῶν φανέντων ἐν τοῖς
ὀφθαλμοῖς παραμένει καὶ ἡ φωνὴ τῶν ἀκουσθέντων ἔναυλος· οὕτω σαφῆ
πάντα ἦν

Even after so much time the forms of what appeared to me still remain in my eyes
and the sound of what was heard rings in my ears: everything was so clear (5).

Later, however, he admits to having forgotten a few details: he cannot remember the end of Tekhne's speech, because it failed to hold his interest: ἀλλ' οὐκέτι μέμνημαι· τὰ πλεῖστα γὰρ ἤδη μου τὴν μνήμην διέφυγεν (but I no longer remember: already most things escaped my memory) (8). He also, as mentioned above, forgot what he scattered when riding in Paideia's chariot, although he did remember the praise he received. Clearly, then, he remembered only what he considers important, or at least, he is only interested in telling us what he thinks is important. How do we know, then, if the speaker is representing himself as he is or as he wants to appear? One might recall also the reference to the *Iliad* with which he opened the account of his dream. Although this certainly could be seen as adding the weight of tradition to his story, it becomes more suspect when one remembers the full story of Agamemnon's dream: Agamemnon chooses not to tell his army the truth of his dream, which was a message from Zeus urging him to attack Troy, but lies to them instead, saying that Zeus told him to sail home. If the speaker is modeling himself after this, does the story he gives us represent the "true" version of the dream, or the false one? The same stakes of appearance are implied for the speaker of the story himself, as for his characters, and by explicitly wavering on his own account, he makes the audience question whether or not to believe him.

Appearance is not the only prominent theme in the text, for Paideia and Tekhne are differentiated not only by how they look, but also by how they speak. The speaker describes Tekhne's speech as almost unintelligible, stumbling over her words as she tries to persuade him: Ταῦτα καὶ ἔτι τούτων πλείονα διαπταίουσα καὶ βαρβαρίζουσα πάμπολλα εἶπεν ἡ Τέχνη, μάλα δὲ σπουδῇ συνείρουσα καὶ πείθειν με πειρωμένη (Tekhne said these things and still more of them, stuttering much and speaking a great deal of gibberish, stringing together words very much in haste and trying to persuade me) (8). The speaker's clearly adverse reaction to her and his eager preference for Paideia imply that Paideia's manner of speaking is as appealing as her clothes. This sets up the second important theme of *Somnium*: it not only matters how one appears, but also how one speaks, and whether or not one has the power to speak in a skillful way. Speaking is set in contrast to *doing* physical labor and producing physical objects, rather than words. In the first description of Tekhne it is mentioned that her hands are heavily calloused from her work (τῷ χειρὶ τύλων ἀνάπλεως) (6). When Paideia then tries to dissuade the speaker from choosing that path, she uses words that refer explicitly to manual labor: if the speaker chooses to follow Tekhne, he will be a χειρῶναξ (mechanic) and make a life with his hands (ἀποχειροβίωτος); both terms contain the word for hand (χειρ). He will always be bent over, toiling with his hands (κολαπτῆρας ἐν ταῖν χερσὶν ἔξεις κάτω νενευκῶς εἰς τὸ ἔργον) (you will hold a chisel in your hands, bending down over your work) (13). The choice of these words puts sculpture in a negative light, portraying it not as fine artistry but rough, mean labor that wears out the hands.

In contrast, Paideia and her path are connected to words and actions on a mental, rather than physical, level. The speaker's training under her will emphasize the mastery of speech: λόγους αὐτῶν ἀπαγγελῶ, καὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν ἔμπειρον ἀποφανῶ (I will relate the words

[of great men], and I will render you experienced in speaking of all things) (10), and having learned from the ancient experts he will attain the “power of speaking” (τὸν λέγειν δυνάμενον) (9). Aided by this mastery of words, the speaker rises up in a flying chariot with Paideia and looks down on the world from above (ἀρθεῖς δὲ εἰς ὕψος ἐγὼ ἐπεσκόπουν ἀπὸ τῆς ἔω ἀρξάμενος ἄχρη πρὸς τὰ ἐσπέρια πόλεις καὶ ἔθνη καὶ δῆμους) (raised up to a height I looked down from the uttermost east to the west upon cities and nations and peoples) (15), the antithesis of the “bending down low” he would have done as a sculptor. The power of speaking is what will allow the speaker not to be a wretched βαρβαρίζουσα like Tekhne, but instead to be on the same elevated level as other *pepaideumenoi*.

However, this contrast is problematic because it is not a simple matter of trading fame with words for ignobleness with labor. Tekhne also promises that as a sculptor, the speaker will win glory for himself, his father, and his country: πῶς μὲν οὐ κλεινὸς αὐτὸς παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἔσῃ, ζηλωτὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἀποδείξεις, περίβλεπτον δὲ ἀποφανεῖς καὶ τὴν πατρίδα (How would you yourself not be glorious before all men, and you will make your father appear enviable, and even show off your fatherland as admired) (8). He will receive praise, just not because of his words (οὐδὲ ἐπὶ λόγοις ... ἐπαινέσονται σε πάντες) (and not for words ... all will praise you) (7).²² Paideia makes a promise that sounds much the same: ἅπασι ζηλωτὸς καὶ ἐπίφθονος ἔσῃ, τιμώμενος καὶ ἐπαινούμενος (you will be envied and regarded with jealousy by all, honored and praised) (11). From this we might conclude that the choice between the two is essentially arbitrary, or even based on the speaker’s desire to pick what seems like the easy road to fame rather than one lined with toils.

²² There is a lacuna in the text at this point.

Why is the kind of fame offered by *Paideia* more appealing to the speaker than that offered by *Tekhne*? The answer to this seems to take us back to the importance of appearances. In this text, it matters how one is seen. If the speaker becomes a sculptor, he will be famous for his statues; these are what people will look at and praise, giving him only a passing glance: μὲν τέχνην ἅπαντες ἐπαινέσονται, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ὅστις τῶν ἰδόντων, εἰ νοῦν ἔχοι, εὖ ξαίτ' ἄν σοὶ ὅμοιος γενέσθαι (everyone will praise your craft, but not one of those looking, if he has sense, would pray to become the same sort of thing as you) (9). But if he becomes a *pepaideumenos*, he will be famous for his speeches; he himself, as a performer and notable figure, will be what people notice and point out to each other: τῶν ὁρώντων ἕκαστος τὸν πλησίον κινήσας δείξει σε τῷ δακτύλῳ, 'οὗτος ἐκεῖνος' ἄλλων) (each of the those looking, urging on his neighbor, will point you out with his finger, saying, "That's him") (11-12). In the terms that *Somnium* has set, it is preferable to be seen and praised oneself; attention and praise directed at some object you have created is not sufficient. If no one knows or cares who you are, you will never amount to anything.

The themes of appearance and speaking in the text intersect to construct the terms by which the *pepaideumenos* should be identified: one must be seen and praised for one's own body, one's own words. In a sense, we are back where we started, seeing the *Somnium* as an exposition and defense of the speaker's *paideia*. However, by the time we have reached this interpretation of the text, the speaker's claims are already problematic. The text links itself to classical tradition by borrowing tropes from Xenophon and Homer, but promptly manipulates them, displacing the story from the foundation we expect. It has become a break with tradition, rather than a link, a moral fable transformed into a clever but equivocal rhetorical device. Instead, the text offers a contrast between high and low status, defined through public

presentation and performance, which divides those who are educated and those who are not. *Paideia* can elevate an individual so he is seen and pointed out by all, and this status is more desirable than the lowly laborer whom no one sees. But this too quickly begins to break down, because the fixation on appearances starts to ring hollow. We are led to wonder if the speaker's transformation into a *pepaideumenos* is only a change of clothing, and thus only an illusion bolstered by empty praise. The speaker makes a point of emphasizing the accuracy of his story, yet there are gaps in his memory; we do not know if he is trustworthy. By trying to defend his *paideia* he undermines it, and in undermining his own claims the speaker brings down *paideia* in general. If we are to mark the *pepaideumenos* by his appearance, how do we know if he has legitimate claim to *paideia*, or if he just pretends to with a purple-bordered cloak and a crowd of admirers?

It is possible, therefore, to read *Somnium* as a blunt satire of the making of a *pepaideumenos*, particularly of *paideia* as expressed through rhetorical performance. Isn't it absurd, Lucian asks, that we should pay so much attention to an educated orator, his appearance and his words, when clearly these can easily be deceiving? Perhaps he is showing how rhetoric, unmoored from moral or philosophical underpinnings, has been reduced to merely the power to persuade the gullible of one's own importance. Or perhaps the speaker, as Gera suggests, is ambivalent about the path that he has chosen and is expressing his doubts in this exposition.²³ I am not content, however, to let the interpretation of the text end here. Lucian is not going to let us off that easily: at the very moment when we think we have peeled back the layers of his deception to the "real" meaning, we find that this, too, is just another mask. The satire of *paideia* that the *Somnium* constructs nevertheless confronts us with the force of what it knows to be true

²³ Gera 1995, 250.

about its own nature, and this makes it impossible to read this work simply as a critique of *paideia*.

To explain what I mean by this, it will be necessary to take a step back and consider the *Somnium* in a broader context. Within the text, as I have just demonstrated, *paideia* is linked to performance, and it is the display of the *pepaideumenos* that marks his identity. But I would also like to consider the text itself as a performance, and see what implications this has for our understanding of it. Although it is impossible to know for certain whether the *Somnium* was performed or in what context, the form of the work suggests that it was. This piece is one of Lucian's *prolaliai*, short works in a style originally intended as introductions to longer speeches, but a style that Lucian took on and developed as an art in its own right. Moreover, the text reads as if it were a performance: the speaker addresses his audience, and imagines their reactions. This does not necessarily mean that Lucian, as the author and likely the performer of the piece, can be identified with the speaker, but it does add another layer of meaning to the situation it enacts. That is, if it was performed, this means that the *Somnium* is a rhetorical performance about rhetorical performance.

A number of authors have addressed the importance of rhetorical performance as evidence of an individual's *paideia* and the accompanying social status in the Second Sophistic, and the ancient Greco-Roman world in general. Under the Roman Empire, oratory lacked much of the political importance it had had under independent Greek city-states, but it nevertheless continued to be a prominent part of public life. For the Greek elite, *paideia* functioned as a form of "cultural capital" that allowed them to display their status and compete with other elites,

analogous to the donation of impressive public works.²⁴ Display is a crucial word here. As Maud Gleason explains it,

Ancient education was innocent of the sort of objectification effected by degrees and credentials that renders all holders of the same credential formally interchangeable...

In the absence of such standardization ... cultural capital tends to be incorporated in particular individuals, who must compete with directly with each other to establish relationships of dominance and authority... Those who pursued *paideia* may have acquired their linguistic competence in literary dialect initially by reading, but they had to display it by speaking.²⁵

Within a culture that is still based largely around face-to-face interaction, a significant part of an individual's identity is formed by how he presents himself and how others respond to his display. Every time an ancient orator made a speech, he had to prove his identity as an elite, educated man in competition with others of the same rank. As a performer, both his appearance and his words were on display and subject to intense scrutiny. It does, in fact, matter what you look like and how others see you, as well as how you speak – when you are performing rhetoric.

In her study of the self-presentation of orators in the Roman world, Gleason has addressed the physical dimension of rhetorical performance and the many ways in which the orators of the Second Sophistic engaged with it. Physiognomy and deportment were signs which marked supposedly innate qualities, particularly gender, and could be decoded and read by a discerning viewer.²⁶ This was complicated in practice, because although norms of gender and of the body existed, they were always open to interpretation in any given individual. An orator who failed to live up to masculine standards in his gait or pitch of voice might be subject to ridicule,

²⁴ Gleason 1995, xxi.

²⁵ Gleason 1995, xxiv.

²⁶ See Gleason 1995.

but even one who appeared thoroughly “masculine” could be suspected of concealing a deviant nature.²⁷ A successful orator, therefore, needed to be concerned with how he appeared, and vigorously train his body in the proper way, yet never allow this appearance to seem like an act.²⁸

Proper speech was also a matter of concern: the writers and orators of the Second Sophistic, including Lucian, used classical Attic, which marked them both as the educated elite and as preservers of an authentic “Greek” culture and literary tradition. A failure to Atticize properly, even a careless verbal slip, put these aspects of one’s identity under question.²⁹ Yet Atticism was not, as Whitmarsh has shown, necessarily a fixed standard to which one could only conform or deviate, any more than manhood was necessarily a static identity with fixed physiognomic marks; rather, these identities were constantly being enacted and negotiated in performance by the orators themselves.³⁰ *Paideia* in the Second Sophistic existed in a context of cultural conservatism that was concerned that the past should be correctly imitated and transmitted. To fail to do so would be less than authentically “Greek”. At the same time, in any given rhetorical performance, improvisation within traditional frameworks was part of the display expected of an orator to impress his audience.³¹ A successful orator, therefore, was not so much one who followed the rules as one who knew how to use them to his advantage, balancing tradition and innovation, norm and deviance.

The crucial point for us here is that the ability to present oneself to one’s own advantage mattered a great deal for an orator. The speaker of the *Somnium* has gotten it right after all: he understands that to be a *pepaideumenos*, it is necessary to be seen by others in a favorable light,

²⁷ Gleason 1995, 79.

²⁸ Gleason 1995, 80.

²⁹ Whitmarsh 2005, 42-43.

³⁰ See Whitmarsh 2005.

³¹ Whitmarsh 2005, 25.

and to do this, one needs to have control over one's appearance and speech. Without these things, *paideia* has no value as cultural capital, and the speaker would be at a disadvantage relative to the educated elite within his society. When viewed from this angle, the themes of presentation and speech have a more serious implication. The "rules seem trivial only to those who do not acknowledge the importance of the game;" what is at stake is not merely the chance of being famous, but the opportunity to be heard at all.³² Tekhne, with her grubby appearance and "βαρβαρίζουσα" speech, does not have the advantages of *paideia*, and she pays for it in the end when she turns to stone. This bizarre transformation seems comical on the surface, but it also represents a permanent act of silencing. Tekhne can say nothing more to plead her case, and she serves as a warning to anyone foolish enough to follow her path. Only by acquiring *paideia* do you gain a voice, or as Paideia puts it, the power of speaking (τὸν λέγειν δυνάμενον); otherwise, you too will be silenced.

Somnium, it seems, has been playing an elaborate game. The speaker presents conventions which he then manipulates, and a claim which he promptly gives us reason to doubt. At the same time, not only does the speaker prove that he is familiar enough with the classical tradition to twist it to his own ends, but he also clearly shows that he understands what it means to display *paideia* in his society. He knows what the rules of the game are; in fact, he knows them so well that he is able to satirize them, and still have them work to his advantage. *Paideia* may indeed be nothing more than a false appearance, but ultimately it doesn't matter, because it is a mask that the speaker retains full control over. If we consider that this piece is itself a performance, composed and recited by an actual orator, this becomes doubly true. In just this short, simple piece, Lucian is able to construct multiple levels of meaning simultaneously. He is

³² Gleason 1995, 53.

only able to do this because he has the “τὸν λέγειν δυνάμενον”, the power of speaking acquired through *paideia*. The *Somnium* is a display of the *paideia*, but it takes the form of a satire of the display of *paideia*: Lucian gets to have it both ways. Moreover, the audience of this performance is implicated in the game he has devised. If the audience members are *pepaideumenoi*, they will recognize the references to classical tradition and how they have been changed, and they will understand what stakes are involved in rhetorical performance. Only then can they understand the satire. But to get the joke is to realize that it is on you, because your complicity in the display and the *paideia* that enables it are being questioned. You have been taken in by a performance that questions its own authenticity, and yet you still find it convincing in the end.

Thus we see that *Somnium*, far from the funny little biographical sketch it appears at first glance, is a cleverly constructed work engaged with the complicated questions of what *paideia* should be and what it means to acquire it. Though he uses a fantastic dream scenario to tell this story, Lucian is clearly aware of what meanings it has in the real world of the educated elite culture. If, however, we are trying to make sense of all the questions *Somnium* has raised concerning *paideia*, the conclusion that the text can be read against itself is ultimately unsatisfying, because we still do not understand why Lucian would choose to construct a piece in this way. He has cleverly manipulated his audience, to be sure, but to what ends? To try to understand this, it will be necessary to look beyond this story alone. *Somnium* gives us a version of the start of the *pepaideumenos*'s career, but there is still more to come. In the next chapters I will examine two other texts, *Rhetorum Praeceptor* and *Bis Accusatus*, which deal with the *pepaideumenos* at different points along his road to educational mastery. There are several points of departure from the present analysis that will lead to significant themes in these other works, and hopefully to a fuller understanding of what Lucian is doing in *Somnium*.

The first of these is the theme of clothing and physical adornment, which crops up repeatedly in Lucian's work. Clothing functions as a marker of identity, whether social status and education level, as we saw in this text, or gender and cultural or ethnic identity, and the visible display of adornment is how that identity is recognized by the rest of the world. Changing clothes can be a way of transforming one's identity. However, whether the identity marked by clothing is authentic representation or a simulated disguise continues to be a matter of concern. The question Lucian prompts us to ask in *Somnium*, whether *paideia* was just a change of clothing or something more, has still not been answered. In a context where presentation is so important for establishing identity, yet also so easily manipulated, what meanings can we assign to appearance? Further analysis will attempt to address this issue.

Finally, there is one other aspect of *paideia* that *Somnium* deals with briefly which may be further illuminated by consideration of other texts. This is the connection between *paideia* and space, movement, and boundaries, and the relationship between these and identity. One of the advantages *Paideia* offers is that she will allow the speaker to travel beyond the borders of the native land; *Techne* explicitly says that her path will foreclose this: οὐποτε ἄπει ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλλοδαπὴν, τὴν πατρίδα, καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους καταλιπὼν (you will never go away to another country, leaving behind your fatherland and household) (7). *Paideia* not only determines how one is seen and whether one has a voice, but also whether or not one has the ability to move through space and across borders. When the speaker rides across the sky, in *Paideia*'s chariot, over many cities and peoples (πόλεις καὶ ἔθνη καὶ δήμους) (16) he is enacting the mobility across geographical space that *paideia* promises to give him. This movement extends beyond real traveling between cities and across national boundaries to metaphorical mobility along social and cultural lines. The speaker's lofty position in *Paideia*'s chariot, high above crowds of

admiring spectators, is a literal enactment of his rise in social status. The connection between *paideia* and movement, therefore, seems to fit straightforwardly with the overall characterization of *paideia* in the *Somnium*: by acquiring it, one achieves a more illustrious social position, and in the terms set by the text, this is more desirable than being a common laborer. Because of the ability to cross boundaries afforded by *paideia*, it is even possible for someone not born into a high social position to ascend to one by choosing the right path.

This suggests that the opinion of the speaker's father, which determines the first, failed stage of his career, is in fact mistaken. One does not need high social status to pursue *paideia*; this can be gained through the pursuit itself. Likewise, although this is barely expressed in the *Somnium* itself, *paideia* may also allow someone to metaphorically cross cultural boundaries, to become "Greek" even if he was not born so. Here, perhaps, is the reason for the speaker to defend his *paideia*. He may have originally been a cultural and social outsider, but he has transformed himself into a *pepaideumenos*, and he wants his audience to know that. His speech demonstrates the ways in which *paideia* can transform identity in order to legitimize his own transformation. This would have been especially significant if Lucian himself had appeared foreign or strange in some way. However, by the time that this piece has brought the audience from the speaker's humble beginnings to his present fame, the terms which we have to understand the transformative power of *paideia* have already become complicated under the multiple layers of Lucian's satire. Appearances, we have been told, are of great importance, yet possibly deceiving. Lucian is both expertly utilizing *paideia* and constantly undermining it. In other texts, when we encounter the *pepaideumenos* at later points along his path, the relationship between his education and his identity will become even more important, but no less

problematic. Whatever power *paideia* has to create social and cultural change, it is not simple, and Lucian wants us to know that.

Chapter 2

Lucian's *Rhetorum Praeceptor* (the Orators' Teacher) deals with the process of acquiring *paideia* necessary for becoming a professional public speaker. While the narrator of the *Somnium* had to choose between *paideia* and another career, for the subject of *Rhetorum Praeceptor*, that choice has already passed. Instead, this piece is an extended address to an unnamed young man who, we are told, wants to be a famous orator, instructing him in the best strategy for achieving his goal. However, under this didactic guise is a satirical aim, for the model of oratory the speaker upholds is the "wrong" one: showy, tasteless, and lacking true skill. *Praeceptor* mocks this style of rhetoric by ironically advocating it as the surest and easiest road to success, and thereby attacking those who attempt to grab fame by pretending to be "real" orators in this manner.

Although there is no reason to think that the subjects of *Somnium* and *Rhetorum Praeceptor*, or even the perspectives of the two pieces, necessarily have any direct relation to one another, they are linked by the assumptions about the appeal of *paideia* we saw in the previous text and the questions these raise. At the beginning of *Praeceptor*, the speaker acknowledges his addressee's reason for pursuing the study of rhetoric: ἀβίωτα γάρ εἶναί σοι φής, εἰ μὴ τοιαύτην τινὰ τὴν δύναμιν περιβάλοιο ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς ἄμαχον εἶναι καὶ ἀνυπόστατον καὶ θαυμάζεσθαι πρὸς ἀπάντων καὶ ἀποβλέπεσθαι (you say that life is unlivable for you, if you do not possess some sort of power in words so as to be unconquerable and irresistible, and be admired and looked at by all) (1). The status of a *pepaideumenos* who displays his learning through public speaking is desirable because it allows him to be seen and heard; that is taken for granted. The only question is how this should be obtained.

The speaker of *Praeceptor* offers his youthful student a different choice, that of the path he will take to become educated and achieve mastery of rhetoric. As in *Somnium*, this choice is described in literal terms: two roads that lead up a mountain to where a personified *Rhetorike* (Rhetoric) sits surrounded by admirers; two guides to lead a hopeful seeker along his way. If he can reach the top of the mountain, the young man will marry Rhetoric and obtain the fame and riches she affords. One road is long and toilsome, its guide tough and manly; the other is smooth and short, serviced by a flamboyant, effeminate guide. The speaker focuses on the latter and advocates choosing him, but it becomes increasingly apparent that that this path and guide represent everything that an orator should not do or be. Lucian's satirical attack is constructed upon an opposition between a legitimate, authentic kind of rhetoric, practiced by real *pepaideumenoι*, and an illegitimate, fake kind attempted by posers and charlatans. However, the placement of authenticity is not as simple as it seems. Lucian cannot expose the false orator without the risk of taking down the good orator with him, a threat which lingers behind every assertion in the text. The problems that arise within this opposition open up cracks in the façade of the text where the complexities of *paideia* and Lucian's attitude towards it can be explored more fully.

The opposition between the two approaches to rhetoric is apparent in the descriptions of the bodies of the two guides and the recommendations that are given to the subject regarding the role of his physical appearance in his speeches. Erik Gunderson interprets this focus on bodies and the physical dimension of oratory as indicative of a politics of sex and gender that real orators had to confront in their public performances.³³ Specifically, the effeminate guide is despicable because he attempts to display his body and his oratory as a source of pleasure in a way that is not socially acceptable for a "real" Greek (or Roman) man to do. However, as

³³ Gunderson 2000, 153.

Gunderson shows, all orators and their bodies are on display, and the scrutiny that attacks the illegitimate manhood of the effeminate guide also threatens to expose the manly guide as another kind of pretended appearance. I focus on Gunderson's analysis because it is useful for showing both how the opposition between the two approaches oratory is meaningful in the cultural context of the Second Sophistic, and also how Lucian displaces aspects of that context in order to make the opposition problematic. However, I intend to extend my argument beyond the bodies of the orators and from there explore the implications that Lucian's displacement has for my interpretation of the text.

Like the figures of Tekhne and Paideia, the two guides are sharply contrasted in the descriptions of their physical appearance. The guide to the hard road has a hard (ὕπόσκληρος) and tanned body (πολὺν τὸν ἥλιον ἐπὶ τῷ σώματι δεικνύων) (showing much sun on his body), a manly look in his eye (ἀρρενωπὸς τὸ βλέμμα) and an appropriately masculine gait (ἀνδρώδης τὸ βάδισμα) (9). The guide of the easy route has a womanly expression (γυναικεῖον τὸ βλέμμα), a mincing step (διασεσαλευμένον τὸ βάδισμα), and he gives off a smell of perfume (μύρων ἀποπνέοντα). He will be instantly recognizable, the narrator says, by his honey-sweet voice (μελιχρὸν τὸ φώνημα) (11). These feminine attributes, as well as his bent neck (ἐπικεκλασμένον τὸν αὐχένα) and habit of scratching his head with one finger (τῷ δακτύλῳ ἄκρῳ τὴν κεφαλὴν κνώμενον) mark this guide as a *cinaedos*, a man who plays the passive role in a sexual relationship, considered degrading in Greek and Roman culture for men past adolescence.³⁴ Thus, this initial description is meant to portray this guide and his path in a negative light, despite the speaker's excessive praise of him as a wise and beautiful orator. At this point in his speech, however, the narrator switches tactics: he invites the effeminate guide to

³⁴ Gunderson 2000, 155. Gunderson cites Richlin and Parker on this subject.

speak for himself, positing the advice he would have for the student of rhetoric. This “donning the mask” of the guide, as Gunderson puts it, enables him to extend the satire without shattering the character under the force of the veiled insults against him.³⁵ It also continues the focus on the effeminate, flamboyant body and the kind of oratory it represents, for the instructions he gives the student are meant to lead to a replication of his own style and appearance.

The introductory description of the effeminate guide characterizes him as a false or illegitimate kind of man, a preening poet like Agathon of Aristophanes’ *Lysistrata*, to whom he is compared (11). The advice he offers would lead his pupil to be the same. Instead of proper, manly self-restraint, he says, one should approach oratory with wanton shamelessness, and be willing to do anything: κόμιζε τοίνυν τὸ μέγιστον μὲν τὴν ἀμαθίαν, εἶτα θράσος, ἐπὶ τούτοις δὲ τόλμαν καὶ ἀναισχυντίαν (bring first the greatest ignorance, then daring, on top of these boldness and shamelessness) (15). Dress in white or bright colors with an eye to showing off one’s body (ἢ ἐσθῆς δὲ ἔστω εὐανθῆς ἢ λευκὴ ... ὥς διαφαίνεσθαι τὸ σῶμα) (15). As he continues in this vein, the performance of oratory becomes conflated with sex and the orator himself an object of pleasure. The guide encourages his student to have, or pretend to have, affairs with both women and men to bolster his reputation as a speaker, and if his aim is to please, then his mouth can serve other purposes as well as speaking (ἢ γλῶττα ὑπηρετείτω καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λόγους καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ὅποσα ἂν δύνηται) (let your tongue be serviceable both for your speeches and for other things however much it is able) (23). All of this goes against dignified standards of behavior, and the audience is supposed to be repulsed by it.

The relentless focus on the physical appearance of the orator is thus an ideal means of insulting a false example of one, and it is certainly possible to read nothing more than that into

³⁵ Gunderson 2000, 160.

this text. However, from a more suspicious perspective, the picture of a flashy performer presented in the description of the effeminate guide, as well as his advice on how to look and act, seem a bit too much like a logical extension of what an orator is supposed to do. Comparing the figures here with those in *Somnium*, the effeminate guide is more like good-looking Paideia, and the weather-beaten guide like grubby Tekhne. This recalls the complicated issues that appearance held in that text, which suggests perhaps that the same terms still apply: for a *pepaideumenos*, appearances do matter. The shameless orator may take this too far, but the fact of his existence should still make the legitimate speaker uneasy. Gunderson locates a similar ambiguity within the text of *Rhetorum Praeceptor*: the personified Rhetoric at the end of the path, the prize the student seeks as a bride, is described in erotic, even exotic terms. She too is beautiful and fair of face (καλὴ καὶ εὐπρόσωπος) and surrounded by admirers like so many little cupids (οἱ ἔπαινοι περὶ πᾶσαν αὐτὴν Ἔρωσι μικροῖς ἐοικότες πολλοὶ) (6). Moreover, she is compared to the Nile (6), an oddly foreign characterization of a goal that should be the epitome of Greek *paideia*. Gunderson notes that both roads, and thus both styles of oratory, lead to this same Rhetoric, which is problematic if they need to be carefully distinguished.³⁶ Rhetoric is a fixed entity; the only difference is whether it is practiced by a real *pepaideumenos* or a fake.³⁷ This hints at a larger problem in the performance of rhetoric. All orators are on display in performance, and this position brings them dangerously close to the status of those whose bodies are on display as objects of pleasure.³⁸ Anyone may be prone to the kind of insults that Lucian is using here.

This does not necessarily mean that Lucian's satire is any less effective, but it does begin to complicate the opposition between good and bad oratory upon which the attack rests.

³⁶ Gunderson 2000, 163.

³⁷ Gunderson 2000, 164.

³⁸ Gunderson 2000 172.

Praeceptor depicts the proponent of the easy road to rhetoric as an illegitimate kind of man, only in doing so it also indicates how all orators are vulnerable to this accusation. A similar problem arises in the other part of the attack, the implication that the effeminate guide and anyone who follows him do not have a real mastery of *paideia*. The effeminate guide offers the easy road to Rhetoric that does not require endless sweat and toil, and so getting there means that one does not need to really become educated, only appear to be. The guide instructs his pupil to learn fifteen or so Attic words, τὸ ἄττα καὶ κᾶτα καὶ μῶν καὶ ἀμηγέπη καὶ λῶστε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα (“sundry”, “eftsoons”, “prithee”, “in some wise”, “fair sir”, and the like) (16) (trans. A. M. Harmon) and have them at the ready to add as a seasoning (ἥδυσμα) in his speech, whether or not they are necessary in the context. These words, which Harmon’s translation approximates with archaic-sounding English examples, do come from the dialect that proper orators would use, but this orator’s method relies on the impression of sophistication that a few cultured-sounding words give, rather than any real mastery of language. That is enough, the guide assures us, to make you appear educated: οὕτω γάρ σε ὁ λεῶς ὁ πολὺς ἀποβλέψονται καὶ θαυμαστὸν ὑπολήψονται καὶ τὴν παιδείαν ὑπὲρ αὐτούς, εἰ ᾗ ἀποστλεγγίσασθαι τὸ ἀποξύσασθαι λέγοις, τὸ δ’ ἡλίῳ θέρεσθαι εἰληθερεῖσθαι (many common folk will look at you thus and interpret you as marvelous and beyond them in education [*paideia*], if you should say “strigiling off” for scraping off, and “solicalification” for warming in the sun) (17) The audience will be so impressed by your archaizing wordplay that they will not notice that your speech lacks substance or wit. Indeed, according to this guide, appearance, not substance, is all that matters. As long as you go about with a crowd of admirers and a book in your hand (ἀκόλουθοι πολλοὶ καὶ βιβλίον ἅει) (15), you will pass for an orator; as long your cloak adorned with a purple stripe, no one will notice that it is of poor quality: ἡ πορφύρεα μόνον ἔστω καλὴ καὶ εὐανθής, κἂν σισύρεα τῶν

παχειῶν (only let the purple [stripe] be beautiful and bright, even if it is a goat's-hair cloak of coarse thread) (16).

Like the spectacle of the guide's effeminate body, these educational instructions are meant to seem ridiculous, and rightly so. Real *pepaideumenoi*, reading this text, or hypothetically, listening to an orator declaim in that manner, would instantly recognize him for the charlatan that he is, and distance themselves both from him and his gullible audience through assurance of their own mastery of the language he ostentatiously effects. Nevertheless, reading against the text, the trouble of appearances still lingers. The reference to purple clothing as the mark of an orator recalls the purple garment that marked the speaker's transformation in *Somnium*. A purple stripe hints at both a possible link to Roman political power and at the display of wealth and privilege in general. Such a status symbol can, like a display of Attic Greek, be a legitimate sign of one's *paideia*; by making it a cover for a fraudulent claim to *paideia*, the parody comes dangerously close to the truth. As Gunderson puts it, "To what extent is [the legitimate orator] not just a man with fifteen hundred or even fifteen thousand Attic words, a man with a purple stripe and a good cloak too?"³⁹ It is a dangerous question to be asking, because it threatens not only the security of the opposition between the two orators, but also the security of audience's position in laughing at the false orator. His fraudulent appearance is what makes him an object of ridicule, yet, as Lucian likes to remind us, appearance and presentation in rhetorical performance is how we mark a *pepaideumenos* in the first place. How do we, the audience, truly know if what we are seeing is real or not?

After he has finished with the niceties of dress and language, the effeminate guide has other equally provocative recommendations. He goes on to say, first, that one should not bother

³⁹ Gunderson 2000, 162.

reading any of the ancient authors, because they are too dull, and instead read more recent ones. He then gives advice for the construction of a speech, which if followed literally, would have the student blurting out nonsense. But the guide also recommends that his pupil fill up his speeches with clichéd references to classical history and literature:

ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ ὁ Μαραθῶν καὶ ὁ Κυνέγειρος, ὧν οὐκ ἄν τι ἄνευ γένοιτο. καὶ ἀεὶ ὁ Ἄθως πλείσθω καὶ ὁ Ἑλλήσποντος πεζευέσθω καὶ ὁ ἥλιος ὑπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν βελῶν σκεπέσθω καὶ Ξέρξης φευγέτω καὶ Λεωνίδας θαυμαζέσθω καὶ τὰ Ὀθρυάδου γράμματα ἀναγιγνωσκέσθω, καὶ ἡ Σαλαμὶς καὶ τὸ Ἀρτεμίσιον καὶ αἱ Πλαταιαὶ πολλὰ ταῦτα καὶ πυκνά.

Let Marathon and Cynegeirus, without which nothing would ever happen, be included in everything. Always let Athos be sailed through and the Hellespont be crossed on foot; and let the sun be covered by the arrows of the Medes and Xerxes flee and Leonidas be admired and the letters of Othryadus be read; and Salamis and Artemisium and Plataea, [pile] those on nice and thick (18).

These allusions, which refer to various events of the Persian Wars in Herodotus's *Histories*, serve the same purpose as a sprinkling of Attic words, creating the impression that the speaker is more educated than he is. This advice acknowledges another truth of legitimate oratory. An orator would be expected to include such references in his speeches, drawn from his extensive knowledge of the classical canon; a list of some these same Persian War events even appear as examples in a treatise on rhetoric by the second-century writer Hermogenes (*On Types of Style* 1.6.246). This false speaker's error is not failing to use literary allusions, but doing it badly, without true *paideia* to support it. Again, the difference between the legitimate and illegitimate orator seems to be one of degree rather than opposition.

The attacks against the effeminate guide and his dubious rhetorical style, from his flashy clothing to his careless use of literary allusions, are meant to portray him as a “fake” orator: a clumsy imitation of what real rhetorical training and practice should look like. However, just as

the guide's excessive focus on self-presentation and appearance was dangerously close to the legitimate orator, positing him as a false imitation likewise has implications for the "right" kind of oratory, and even for a true kind of *paideia*. In the Greek-speaking world, training in rhetoric had long been based around the imitation (*mimesis*) of traditional models; standard practice exercises (*progymnasmata*) often did use the same clichéd literary or historical examples.⁴⁰

Moreover, the very idea of *paideia* in the Second Sophistic relies upon the imitation (*mimesis*) of the past in order to replicate and preserve it.⁴¹ If we read *Rhetorum Praeceptor* with this central role of *mimesis* in mind, it makes the placement of legitimacy somewhat problematic. The satire requires us to assume that illegitimate orator is a false pretender, an imitator of true *paideia*, yet every orator is imitating to some degree simply because of the nature of his training. How then can we separate the two, if not by authenticity?

Gunderson identifies in the text a finer, more malleable distinction between a "harder, manly imitation – presumably imitation of the truth – and an easier, effeminate imitation of wanton falsity."⁴² Those who take the hard road to Rhetoric represent a supposedly truer kind of imitation, and therefore they can insist upon the authenticity of their own transformation while denying that of others: "I am; he merely seems."⁴³ Although specifically addressing gender, Maud Gleason's analysis of the construction of masculinity is relevant here: "[ancient thinkers] shared a notion of gender identity built upon polarized distinctions ... that purported to characterize the gulf between men and women but actually divided the male sex into legitimate and illegitimate members ... Masculinity was still thought to be grounded in 'nature', yet it remained fluid and incomplete until firmly anchored by the discipline of an acculturative

⁴⁰ Anderson 1993, 47-53.

⁴¹ See Whitmarsh 2001 for further discussion of *mimesis* and education in the Second Sophistic.

⁴² Gunderson 2000, 165.

⁴³ Gunderson 2000, 162.

process.”⁴⁴ This slippage allowed an opponent to attack a suspected *cinaedus* both for apparent femininity and for possible over-compensating hyper-masculinity. In *Praeceptor* this same concept extends to all aspects of rhetorical performance and the trappings of *paideia*. The “false” orator becomes an object of ridicule because he is only pretending to be a *pepaideumenos*, and not even doing a very good job of it. However, as Lucian’s satire takes on the ways in which that orator is pretending, it reminds us how similar they are to the methods of a real *pepaideumenos*, separated only by a matter of degree. The insult against this poser, therefore, actually depends on the negative qualities of what he “really” is, and the illusion that imitation of the legitimate orator is closer to the “truth”.

This close examination of the opposition between the two paths to rhetoric disrupts the implication that one of them is more authentic than the other. In unmasking the showy, effeminate guide as a poser, Lucian also suggests that all oratory is performance, and thus the manly orator is also performing his role as a proper *pepaideuamenos*, simply in a manner that insists upon its more legitimate claim to the truth. I would like to push this one step further and suggest that we need to question our assumptions about which voices in *Rhetorum Praeceptor* are authentic and what value we assign to the things they say. I will begin with the following example. In his laundry list of historical clichés to round out a speech, the guide of the easy road mentions this: ἀεὶ ὁ Ἄθως πλείσθω καὶ ὁ Ἑλλήσποντος πεζευέσθω (Always let Athos be sailed through and the Hellespont crossed on foot) (18). At first glance, there seems to be a joke in this, because Athos is a mountain on a peninsula and the Hellespont is a narrow strait of the Aegean, so it appears he has confused the proper way of crossing them. This is what we expect from such an ignorant orator; just a few sentences before, he encouraged the student to string

⁴⁴ Gleason 1995, 80-81.

words together regardless of sense, even if he were to talk about putting a greave on the forehead (περὶ τῷ μετώπῳ μὲν ἢ κνημίδι), and a helmet on the shin (περὶ τῇ κνήμῃ δὲ ἢ κόρυς) (18). But if you have read Herodotus, you will know that, in fact, the Persian king Xerxes dug a canal to go around Athos and built a bridge over the Hellespont. The guide's statement is accurate after all. With that knowledge in mind, the humor shifts from a simple throwaway joke to the hint of something much more complicated. An audience of *pepaideumenoi* which recognizes the allusion will also see the implied threat of identifying an ignorant reader, who laughs unknowingly at the mix-up of words, with the despicable guide. This point in the text seems to cut through the mask of the false orator down to the mocking voice of the author. Yet it is all within the speech of the guide, the poser, whose exhortations are supposed to be the opposite of what is correct.

Hitherto we have assumed that the narrators of *Praeceptor*, both the effeminate guide and the speaker who directs us to him, are wholly satirical, expressing ideas that are being mocked by the author of the piece and which we are not supposed to take seriously. No proper orator would desire to be the sort of wanton *cinaedus* who is presented as our ideal model. Moreover, no one with any sense would think that his tasteless rhetorical style was equivalent to the speech of someone who had spent years educating himself and perfecting his craft. Even for a modern audience without cultural prejudice toward any particular style of rhetoric, it seems unreasonable that a short, easier road to fame would be better than a long and toilsome one, and therefore we are inclined to dismiss someone who makes such a claim. However, the example above suggests that we should not be too quick to judge what the "real" meaning of any one statement in the text might be. Instead, the meanings of the assertions presented throughout the text are constantly being destabilized, and they come to present a more complicated picture of the author's purpose

than simply a satirical invective. As the first example suggests, the destabilization of meanings manifests itself most clearly in the many allusions and references that are woven into the text. In the next section I will explore the role of some of these allusions in greater detail and the additional possibilities for interpretation that they suggest.

If we can no longer dismiss everything that comes out of the mouth of the supposedly unreliable narrators of *Praeceptor*, it becomes necessary to deal with the points on which they seem to speak the truth. One constant refrain of the advocates of the easy road to rhetoric creates a persistent contradiction throughout the text. The student is advised to ignore the examples of ancient masters like Demosthenes or Plato, which the speaker describes as “stale” (ξωλα) and “not easy to imitate” (οὐ ῥάδια μιμεῖσθαι). The text returns repeatedly to this image of the past as something so old and faded that it is not worth the herculean effort it would take to model oneself after it, not when fame is readily obtainable by easier means. Yet almost every point made in the text relies on the author’s clever reworking of references from literary and historical sources, and the audience’s knowledge of the past to interpret them. This may be partly for the sake of irony: an orator who had really taken the easy road and never learned the classics would not be able to fully understand the piece that mocks him. However, I think it also has other implications for the text. The first of these is that Lucian is aware of the contradiction he has created and is using it deliberately to subvert the claims of the text in various places. The second is that the element of truth in such disparagement of a reliance on the past, contradictory though it may be, points towards a comment that *Praeceptor* is making about *paideia* and the practice of oratory.

Especially in the first half of the text, there are several recurring themes to the allusions that the speaker uses. One is references to Hesiod and another, somewhat related, are mentions of

the Golden Age of humankind, the time of Kronos. Although they often seem to have been thrown in at random, taken together these references illustrate the thread of contradiction that Lucian is spinning through the text. Hesiod first appears when the speaker invokes him as an authority for a quick transformation into an orator: Ἡσίοδος μὲν ὀλίγα φύλλα ἐκ τοῦ Ἑλικῶνος λαβὼν αὐτίκα μάλα ποιητῆς ἐκ ποιμένος κατέστη (Hesiod, taking a few branches from Mount Helicon, at once became a poet from a shepherd) (4). If Hesiod could become a poet just by receiving a branch from the Muses, surely one can become an orator by some similarly painless means – a rather odd interpretation of that story. But what is even more interesting is that when he cites Hesiod again, the speaker seems to be disavowing him rather than using him as authoritative evidence. When he introduces the hard road to rhetoric, he declines to describe it in detail, saying that Hesiod has already done so (ἔφθη γὰρ ἤδη Ἡσίοδος εὖ μάλα ὑποδείξας αὐτήν, ὥστε οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ δεήσει) (for Hesiod has already said it, having shown this road very well, so that it will not be necessary for me to do so) (7). But since this is the road he is urging the student not to take, he implies that whatever Hesiod had to say was of little merit. This disavowal of the ancient poet continues in a more veiled form when the speaker expresses regret that he toiled through the hard road himself, not knowing the easier way: οὐ γὰρ ἐώρων νέος ὦν ἔτι τὸ βέλτιον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ποιητὴν ἐκείνον ἀληθεύειν ὥμην λέγοντα ἐκ τῶν πόνων φύεσθαι τὰ ἀγαθὰ (being young still I had not seen better, but I thought that poet spoke the truth when he said that good things arise from toils) (8). This recalls the proverb of Epicharmus quoted in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, τῶν πόνων πωλοῦσιν ἡμῖν πάντα τὰ γάθ' οἱ θεοί (the gods sell all good things to us at the price of toils) (Xen. Mem. 2.1.20). In Xenophon, this line is immediately preceded by another related quote from *Works and Days*:

τὴν μὲν γὰρ κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι ῥηιδίως:

Λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει.
 τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροισιν ἔθηκαν
 ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν
 καὶ τροχὸς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὶ δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται,
 ῥηιδίῃ δὲ ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπὴ περ ἐοῦσα.

Badness can be got easily and in shoals; the road to her is smooth, and she lives very near us. But between us and Goodness the gods have placed the sweat of our brows; long and steep is the path that leads to her, and it is rough at the first; but when a man has reached the top, then is she easy to reach, though before that she was hard (Hes. WD 287-292, trans. Hugh G. Evelyn-White).

Hesiod's imagery of the two roads mirrors that in *Praeceptor*, except that Lucian has reworked this allegory in a way that displaces its original meaning, much like he did with the choice of Heracles in *Somnium*. Good and bad are inverted, and rhetoric (or *paideia*) replaces both. The speaker twists these allusions so that they can all work in favor of the easy path.

Not only do these references invert the original meaning of Hesiod's words, they also displace the meanings involved in the very fact of their use as allusions. Hesiod is first invoked as an exemplum and then dismissed as useless, but even the act of dismissal depends upon the assumption that he can be used as a point of reference. In other words, Lucian's audience needs to have read Hesiod (and Xenophon) to understand what he is talking about; he says so himself in the passage quoted above (7). Yet the purpose for which he is using the reference is to tell us, in effect, that we should not bother reading Hesiod in the first place. Now everything has become rather confusing. Are we to take Hesiod as an authoritative example or not? For that matter, how can we correctly interpret any example that the speaker gives us? I think that the confusion here should be viewed not as careless inconsistency but as a deliberate strategy that allows the text to contain multiple layers of meaning even if they are contradictory. Just as the speaker of *Praeceptor* is simultaneously identifying with and distancing himself from the allusions he is

using, the confusion around what is really meant in the text at this point allows us to read his message both satirically and seriously. On one level, we can see this ridiculous twisting of Hesiod as discrediting the speaker's claims; but at the same time we may also view it with a hint of truth, leading us to question why it is that we take for granted the wise authority of an ancient poet who got his gift from a sacred branch. Neither one of these is definitively the "correct" interpretation; instead, Lucian prompts his audience to consider both of them together, paradoxically.

A similar contradiction can be found in another scattering of references that, although not directly related to Hesiod, invoke the description in *Works and Days* of the Golden Age of man under Kronos. After he discusses his own foolish choice to take the hard road to rhetorical mastery, the speaker assures his addressee that *he* will have it much easier: σοὶ δὲ ἄσπορα καὶ ἀνήροτα πάντα φυέσθω καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ Κρόνου (may everything sprout for you unplanted and unplowed as in the time of Kronos) (8). The "ἄσπορα καὶ ἀνήροτα", unplanted and unplowed, is a quote from the *Odyssey*, from a passage where Odysseus describes the land of the Cyclops (Hom. Od. 9.108-109), but also recalls Hesiod's description of the time before agriculture, when the earth produced fruit without cultivation (Hes. WD 117-118). Another reference to agriculture appears in the description of the effeminate guide: μάθοις ἂν ὥς οὐχὶ τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐστίν, "οἱ ἀρούρης καρπὸν ἔδομεν", ἀλλὰ τι ξένον φάσμα δρόσῳ ἢ ἀμβροσίᾳ τρεφόμενον (you would learn that he is not one of us, "who eat the fruit of the field", but some strange phantom fed on dew or ambrosia) (11). The "οἱ ἀρούρης καρπὸν ἔδομεν" is another quote, this time from the *Iliad* (6.142-3), which continues the metaphor of agriculture for prosperity: this guide does not need to plow or sow in order to reap the bounteous fruits of oratory, just as the student who follows him will enjoy the bounty of Rhetoric without toil. No

sooner is this connection between the easy road and the Golden Age established, however, than another contradictory reference arises to complicate it. The guide of the hard road, who supposedly represents everything that this Golden Age is not, is described as a man so ancient that he is still around from the age of Kronos: ἀρχαῖος ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ Κρονικὸς ἄνθρωπος (an ancient and truly Kronos-like man) (9). With this comparison suddenly the terms reverse themselves. Instead of taking us to a mythical time before drudgery, turning to the past leaves us only with something that is old in the sense of being outdated, no longer relevant. Which version of the age of Kronos should we believe? The answer, I would suggest, is both at once, or perhaps neither; the confusion is the point. The shifting of terms makes it difficult to identify one authoritative viewpoint in the text that would clearly distinguish the voice of the speaker and guide from that of the “author”, which allows Lucian to hint at different ideas without having to firmly declare one or the other.

In both of these examples, a string of allusions and themes, although related, seem to make contradictory points. This has the effect of obscuring certainty about the text, because it is confusing for the reader to determine what is supposed to be taken seriously and what is not. By virtue of this confusion, the text raises the possibility that more than one side of the apparent contradiction might be “true.” Perhaps Hesiod can be both a source of wisdom and an outdated literary legend of little relevance for the present. A man from the time of Kronos may have enjoyed prosperity without work, but if he were still around today, he would indeed be quite ancient. Perhaps, for a *pepaideumenos* of Lucian’s time, the past is as revered and irretrievable as a golden age. Yet the text is not saying that we should take the speaker’s or effeminate guide’s advice and not read Hesiod, because that would defeat the purpose of referencing him in the first place. Lucian still gets to have it both ways, as he did in *Somnium*, mocking *paideia* with his

own display of *paideia*. In *Praeceptor* this process is even more difficult to locate, I think, because the piece focuses so intently upon a negatively-portrayed figure, the effeminate guide, that it is tempting to brush aside the many pitfalls Lucian has laid along the way to tease his audience and prevent them from simply laughing at a despised opponent.

A point that *Praeceptor* does clearly make, if the audience is paying attention, is that the past is over and therefore that models of the past may be of limited use to the present. When the speaker describes what the guide of the hard road to rhetoric, that ancient “Κρονικός” (Kronos-like) man, will tell his student to learn and why such things are worthless, he compares the words of the ancients to corpses that need to be dug up: νεκρούς εἰς μίμησιν παλαιούς προτιθεῖς καὶ ἀνορύπτειν ἀξιῶν λόγους πάλαι κατορωρυγμένους ([he will say these things] putting out ancient corpses for imitation and thinking it right to dig up words buried long ago) (10). What use are such examples for us nowadays, he asks, when times have changed: μαχαιροποιουῦ υἱὸν καὶ ἄλλον Ἀτρομήτου τινὸς γραμματιστοῦ ζηλοῦν ἀξιῶν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐν εἰρήνῃ μῆτε Φιλίππου ἐπιόντος μῆτε Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐπιτάττοντος, ὅπου τὰ ἐκείνων ἴσως ἐδόκει χρήσιμα (he will expect you to emulate the son of a sword-maker [Demosthenes] and another son of some clerk, Atrometus, and these things even in peacetime when no Philip is attacking and no Alexander drawing up troops, [at a time] when it seemed that there was equally need of those things) (10). It is impossible to ignore the truth in these words, no matter how much we try to discredit the speaker. Lucian is writing and practicing rhetoric in the second century CE, not the fourth or fifth centuries BCE. He and his fellow *pepaideumenoi* may be using language and rhetorical devices from those times, they may be impeccably versed in the history and literature from that era, but it is not their reality. Their rhetorical displays of *paideia* have value primarily

as means of accruing personal prestige and as a way to compete with other elites, rather than as instruments that sway political processes and turn wars, as they did in classical Athens.

The inconvenient truth of this assertion is the crux which brings us back to the opposing style of oratory represented by the two roads, their embodiment in the guides, and the question of authenticity. It suggests a reason why Lucian should have been showing us how all oratory, legitimate and illegitimate, is really a performed identity. The legitimate orator – the one who has taken the hard road, is steeped in true *paideia*, and strives to imitate Demosthenes – when we place this orator in the context of his own time, it seems that he is merely imitating a past existence that he can never fully reach. It is impossible for him to truly be like Demosthenes, because the historical conditions in which such orators lived no longer exist. He can only pretend, only imitate: this orator, too, is a poser. Perhaps he does not have the claim to authenticity that was assumed in distinguishing him from a follower of the easy road, and maybe, in fact, he is even more of a pretender than one who does not try to maintain the allusion that he is living in fourth-century Athens.

I am not suggesting that we relocate the authenticity entirely upon the figure of the effeminate guide and what he represents; his negative depiction and lack of *paideia* still discredit the advice he would have his student follow. In *Rhetorum Praeceptor*, as in *Somnium*, Lucian is able to play multiple sides at the same time, satirizing his subject but also using that satire to point out problematic and uncomfortable truths. He manages to both uphold a traditional model of an elite, educated orator, and at the same time, to subvert it. Moreover, the text cautions us against taking any one voice alone to be completely “true,” as I have shown, and this warning still applies even at the point when it seems we can make sense of Lucian’s tricks. However, it is interesting to note that the original speaker presents himself as having taken the hard road,

though he now advocates the easy. Perhaps here is the orator that *Praeceptor* is implying we should aspire to be, one who has *paideia* but also understands its performative status and is aware of the continual inadequacy of his own imitation of the past. This speaker, for all his bad advice, may have had it right all along.

Chapter 3

Lucian's *Bis Accusatus* (Twice Accused) returns to the matter that was central to *Somnium*, a defense of *paideia*. This time, however, the issue in question is not the process of education but the product of it, in the sense that *paideia* can mean “culture” as well as “education.” The setting is a courtroom conducted by the Olympian gods, in which a series of suits are put forth by personified Arts and Sciences (ἐπιστήμαις καὶ τέχναις) concerning mortals (3). In the final case, a figure called the “Syrian” is prosecuted first by Rhetoric, for ill-treatment (κάκωσις), and then by Dialogue, for moral affront and insult (ὕβρις). It appears that the Syrian was trained in the art of rhetoric, but later abandoned her for philosophical dialogue; even then, however, he was not content to leave this art as he found it, instead mixing dialogue with comedy to create a new, bizarre-seeming genre. The nature of this case reverberates out from the text itself to the rest of Lucian's corpus. The Syrian can be seen as a representation of the author's persona, and his trial represents Lucian's defense of his own seriocomic dialogues and other strange literary creations, of which *Bis Accusatus* is one. The text therefore aims to defend and secure its author's claim to legitimacy within the literary tradition, with *paideia* as the key point of the argument.

What *Bis Accusatus* makes clear that *Somnium* and *Rhetorum Praeceptor* dealt with only in passing, is that *paideia* is by nature Greek, and that the social status it confers is specifically status within the Greek-speaking world and literary tradition. In this world the Syrian is an outsider, a “barbarian,” whose presence is as suspicious as his strange literary creations. Even the suitability of his case to be tried in a Greek courtroom is questioned:

Ἐρμῆς

ῥητορικὴ κακώσεως τῷ Σύρῳ: διάλογος τῷ αὐτῷ ὕβρεως.

Δίκη

τίς δὲ οὗτός ἐστιν; οὐ γὰρ ἐγγέγραπται τοῦνομα.

Ἑρμῆς

οὕτως ἀποκλήρου, τῷ ῥήτορι τῷ Σύρῳ: κωλύσει γὰρ οὐδὲν καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ
ὀνόματος.

Δίκη

ἰδοῦ, καὶ τὰς ὑπερορίους ἤδη Αῤῥήνησιν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ ἀποκληρώσομεν, ἅς
ὑπὲρ τὸν Εὐφράτην καλῶς εἶχε δεδικάσθαι;

Hermes: Rhetoric against the Syrian for ill-treatment; Dialogue against the same for
insult.

Justice: Who is this man? For his name is not recorded.

Hermes: Chose the lots for the jury thus, for the Syrian orator: even without the
name nothing will hinder it.

Justice: See here, shall we now allot Athenians in the Areopagus to the foreign cases,
which would be better tried beyond the Euphrates? (14)

The emphasis on his foreignness suggests that the implicit question on trial here, for both the
character of the Syrian and the authorial persona he represents, is whether or not this non-Greek
has the right to claim Greek *paideia* and use it the way he does. In this text, Lucian addresses this
issue by drawing from elements of tradition but destabilizing them in ways that show how
complex the notions of “Greekness” and *paideia* really are.

Although the trial of the Syrian is the part of *Bis Accusatus* that most directly relates to
this question of *paideia*, it is necessary to first examine the large portion of text that precedes it,
because Lucian begins to construct a framework for interpreting the final case long before the
Syrian enters the courtroom. The piece begins with a rant by Zeus, who complains about how
much trouble it is to be a god: ἀλλ’ ἐπιτριβεῖεν ὅποσοι τῶν φιλοσόφων παρὰ μόνοις τὴν
εὐδαιμονίαν φασὶν εἶναι τοῖς θεοῖς. εἰ γοῦν ἤδεσαν ὅποσα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔνεκα πάσχομεν
(It vexes me how many philosophers say that good fortune is present for the gods alone; if only

they knew how much we suffer on account of mortals) (1). Instead of a grand image of the divine, he presents a comic portrait of divinities running hither and thither to serve the whims of humankind, with scarcely a moment to themselves. This initial image sets up the context of the piece in a number of ways. First, it establishes a tone of comic reversal: in this text, serious matters are going to be inverted and jumbled with lighter ones so that they seem absurd. This is exactly what Dialogue will accuse the Syrian of doing with his lofty philosophical subjects (33). The humor has the effect of disarming the audience; by taking conventions that everyone knows, like the gods as they might be depicted in Homer or another authoritative source, and inverting them, Lucian prompts his audience to consider the absurdity in the matters they hold most serious.

In terms of narrative, the plight of the gods offers a reason for why all of these cases should now be brought to trial. The gods have been so busy, Zeus explains, that a backlog of court cases is piling up, and many have now grown old and cobwebbed: ἰδοὺ γέ τοι ὑπ' ἀσχολίας τοσαύτας ἐώλους δίκας φυλάττομεν ἀποκειμένους ὑπ' εὐρῶτος ἤδη καὶ ἀραχνίων διεφθαρμένους (look how many old indictments we keep laid away because of business, now ruined by decay and cobwebs) (3). Zeus, in consultation with Hermes, resolves to take care of them straight away, and they summon Dike (Justice) to oversee these trials in Athens at the Areopagus. Hermes and Justice fly down to Athens, where they announce the cases and empanel jurors from the citizens of Athens to try them. In this way the gods' presence sets in place a reasonably logical, if somewhat bizarre, explanation for the course of the narrative. However, it also has significant implications for the setting of the events in the text. Because the gods transcend time and space, they bridge the gap between past and present, allowing the suspension of disbelief necessary for this strange court session to take place. The trials are, presumably, set

in the present, but it is still possible for the old, cobwebbed cases from some vague past to stand alongside the recent case of the Syrian. In this sense the setting also transcends time, taking place not in any real past or present age but in a timeless classical Athens that seems to exist now just as it has before.

The same duality works for geographical space. On the one hand, the setting is highly localized: there is an explicit decision to hold the trials in Athens, on the acropolis at the Areopagus. When Hermes and Justice arrive there, they mention specific geographical features around Athens (προϊώμεν, ὦ Δίκη, ταύτη εὐθὺ τοῦ Σουνίου μικρὸν ὑπὸ τὸν Ὑμηττὸν ἐπὶ τὰ λαϊὰ τῆς Πάρνηθος, ἔνθα αἱ δύο ἐκείναι ἄκραι) (Justice, let us go to this place near Sunium, a little under Hymettus, upon the left of Parnassus, where those two peaks are) (8). At the same time, the gods are shown to transcend space; they have the ability to look down from heaven to all corners of the world at once, even to summon souls from the dead if they are needed for trial (ὅποσοι δὲ ἀποθέμενοι γραφὴν πρὶν εἰσελθεῖν ἀπέθανον, καὶ τούτους ὁ Αἰακὸς ἀναπεμψάτω) (However many, having escaped an indictment, died before coming to trial, let Aiaikos send these back up) (12). This suggests that the Athens to which they have come isn't necessarily any more real than the time in which it is set, but exists only in the imagination.

Thus the setting of *Bis Accusatus* exists somewhere between the past and the present, in both a specific location that carries a wealth of significance in itself, and in the imaginary world of the gods and their affairs. This slippage creates a space where the improbable events of the narrative can take place with some semblance of logic. The compression of temporal and geographical distance allows a Syrian to stand trial alongside citizens of classical Athens, and implicitly, for him to be judged in full view of the Greek rhetorical and philosophical tradition he seems to be so casually toying with. At the same time, by reminding us that this space is

imaginary, the text highlights the actual gap between past and present and the leap of fantasy required to bridge it. I propose that the fantastical setting of *Bis Accusatus* invokes the literary imagination of the Second Sophistic, with its predominant focus on the historical legacy of Greek culture and on Athens as a cultural center. Here Lucian acknowledges the significance of this idealized time and place, while pointing out that they are, for present readers, an imaginary setting possible only in fiction.

Lucian adds another twist to the scenario right after we reach Athens. When Hermes and Justice arrive at the acropolis, they happen to meet the god Pan and chat with him about the current state of affairs in Athens. This encounter seems odd in the context of the narrative, for Pan plays no apparent role in the upcoming trials. Justice is also initially puzzled by his appearance, but Hermes explains:

ἀγνοεῖς τὸν Πᾶνα, τῶν Διονύσου θεραπόντων τὸν βακχικώτατον; οὗτος ᾧκει
μὲν τὸ πρόσθεν ἀνὰ τὸ Παρθένιον, ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν Δάτιδος ἐπίπλουν καὶ τὴν
Μαραθῶνάδε τῶν βαρβάρων ἀπόβασιν ἦκεν ἄκλητος τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις σύμμαχος,
καὶ τὸ ἀπ' ἐκείνου τὴν ὑπὸ τῇ ἀκροπόλει σπήλυγγα ταύτην ἀπολαβόμενος οἰκεῖ
μικρὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ Πελασγικοῦ εἰς τὸ μετοίκιον συντελῶν.

Don't you recognize Pan, the most Bacchic of the followers of Dionysus? He came previously down from Parthenion, he sailed towards Datis, and at the ascent of the barbarians to Marathon he was present uncalled as an ally to the Athenians; and from that time, having received this cave under the acropolis, he dwells a little beyond the Pelasgicon, paying the metics' tax (9).

He identifies the Arcadian god as a metic, a resident alien who must pay a special tax to live in Athens, but does not have the full rights of an Athenian citizen. As a metic his status is somewhat ambiguous, neither fully included nor entirely foreign. However, Hermes also

mentions his importance to the city because of his role in aiding the Athenians during the battle of Marathon. This places Pan in an interesting position. He is clearly an outsider, not fully assimilated: Justice remarks on his horned (κερασφόρος) and hairy-legged (ὁ λάσιος ἐκ τοῖν σκελοῖν) appearance (9). Later Pan himself acknowledges that he is a rustic who lacks learning and culture: οὐκ οἶδα ὅλως ὅ τι καὶ λέγουσιν οὐδὲ συνίημι τὴν σοφίαν αὐτῶν ὄρειος γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα ῥημάτια, καὶ ἀστικά οὐ μεμάθηκα (I do not entirely know what they are even saying, nor do I understand their wisdom; as a mountain-dweller I have never learned these refined little phrases and urbane matters) (11). Nevertheless, Pan also has a central role in the development of the city of Athens, which distinguishes him from the rest of the barbarians, and he occupies a space near the heart of Athens in his cave on the side of the acropolis. Thus he is an outsider on the inside, a figure who is marginal yet very close to the center.

The issue of outsiders and insiders is also relevant to the figure of the Syrian, and by extension, to Lucian as the author of this work. I suggest that by including Pan at this point in the narrative, the text introduces the concept of an outsider on the inside, and in this way gives the audience a framework by which to view the Syrian when they later encounter him. It is not that Pan stands for the Syrian, *per se*; rather, Pan's story reminds us that even at the center of a quintessentially Athenian context there are elements of supposed foreignness and difference. With this in mind, it becomes more difficult for an audience to view the Syrian – and perhaps, even Lucian himself – as wholly “other”. By complicating the assumptions that have prompted the charges against him, Lucian begins to build his case.

Thus far it is apparent that the text has complicated the issues surrounding the Syrian's trial in several ways: first, by inverting conventions to humorous effect; then, by exposing a gap

between the literary imagination of the past and the reality of the present; and finally, by showing that marginal elements are already present in a supposedly Greek context. Bearing in mind these complications, I will now jump ahead to the point in the text when the “double accusation” is finally brought forth. This case is different from the others; a large crowd gathers to watch the proceedings, and quite understandably, Hermes remarks, for this case has a source of interest: τό τε γὰρ μὴ ἔωλον εἶναι τὴν κρίσιν, ἀλλὰ καινὴν καὶ ξένην χθές, ὥσπερ ἔφη, ἐπηγγελέμενην (the trial is not old [ἔωλον], but new and strange, having been announced yesterday, as you said) (25). His characterization of the case as new and strange (καινὴν καὶ ξένην) highlights the Syrian’s presence as both a novelty and a possible cause for suspicion, particularly in the choice of the word “ξένην.” The Greek word “ξένος” more accurately means “foreign,” not a word we would necessarily expect to appear in that phrase, and so its use here reminds us again that the Syrian is an alien as well as a newcomer. But by describing this case as μὴ ἔωλον, “not old”, Hermes also emphasizes a break with the rest of the cases, which Zeus specifically described using the same word (ἑώλους δίκας) (3). The word “ἔωλος” literally means “day old,” “stale,” or “out of date,” and it seems to be a favorite term of Lucian’s; it also appears in *Somnium* and *Rhetorum Praeceptor*. In *Praeceptor* the examples of the ancient masters are dismissed as “ἑώλα παραδείγματα,” stale paradigms that are too hard to follow (*Rhet. Pr.*9). Given the implications of that phrase in the context of *Praeceptor*, which I examined in the last chapter, I think the word choice here is significant. Literally, of course, those cases are out of date because they have been sitting around for so long, but characterizing them in this way reminds us again that the time from which they arise has past. There is not even a sense of their glorious monumental quality as ancient relics; rather, they are old and musty like a stale piece of bread. This displaces any idealized past that we might be tempted to see in the

world of *Bis Accusatus*, but it also suggests that the Syrian has value precisely because he is *not* ἕωλος, even if his strangeness is otherwise threatening. This is another important point to consider in how he will make his defense.

The first charge against the Syrian is brought by Rhetoric. After a flowery introduction that uses a hodgepodge of quotes from Demosthenes' orations (*On the Crown* and *Olynthiac 3*), she explains how this foreigner came to be with her. In this her similarity to both the Rhetoric of *Rhetorum Praeceptor* and Paideia of *Somnium* become apparent. Rhetoric found him as young man, still a "barbarian" in speech and appearance, and educated him: βάρβαρον ἔτι τὴν φωνὴν καὶ μονονουχὶ κἀνδυν ἐνδεδυκότα εἰς τὸν Ἀσσύριον τρόπον, περὶ τὴν Ἰωνίαν εὐροῦσα πλαζόμενον ἔτι καὶ ὃ τι χρῆσαιτο ἑαυτῷ οὐκ εἰδότα παραλαβοῦσα ἐπαίδευσα (finding him still a barbarian in speech and wearing nothing but a Median garment in Assyrian style, wandering about Ionia, not knowing what was good for him, I took him up and educated him) (27). Later, much taken with his admiration and devotion to her, she married him to bring him fully into Greek society: εἶτα ἀγαγοῦσα αὐτὸν εἰς τοὺς φυλέτας τοὺς ἐμοὺς παρενέγραψα καὶ ἀστὸν ἀπέφηνα (then leading him to my tribe I enrolled him and displayed him as a citizen) (27). She thus plays the role for the Syrian of both a guide and teacher, like Paideia, and of a wife who transfers social status to her husband, as the other Rhetoric did. This story also invokes many of the same elements that were involved in the transformations described in the previous two works, including dress, presentation, and speech. The Syrian's identity as a non-Greek is marked by his "barbaric" speech and his Assyrian-style dress (κἀνδυν ἐνδεδυκότα εἰς τὸν Ἀσσύριον τρόπον). A significant part of what Rhetoric does to change him involves changing his dress, presumably to something more civilized (κλεινὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἀοίδιμον ἐποίουν κατακοσμοῦσα καὶ περιστέλλουσα) (arranging and dressing him up, I made him famous and

sung of) (27). It is also important for her to display him in public (ἀσπὸν ἀπέφηνα) to confirm his new status in society. Overall this presents a picture consistent with what we have seen about what is involved in the transformation of a rhetorical education and how the identity of a *pepaideumenos* is expressed. Moreover, it suggests that we should see the Syrian as almost a later version of someone like the speaker in *Somnium* or the addressee in *Praeceptor*, who has already passed through his process of education.

If we read him as such, however, we have to take into account what an analysis of those previous works has revealed. In *Somnium* and *Rhetorum Praeceptor*, Lucian shows how the connection between appearance and identity, for a *pepaideumenos*, is fraught with complexity, and I would suggest that it is no different here. My interpretation is, of course, largely based on choosing to read the texts in the order that I have, which does not necessarily bear any relation to how they were written or performed. However, I would argue that not only does *Bis Accusatus* invite a connection with the other works, but it also incorporates hints of the same complexities in the text itself. I find evidence of this in the two cases that come to trial before the Syrian does: the Academy against Drunkenness (Μέθη), over the enslavement of the man Polemo; and Stoa against Pleasure, accused of stealing away her lover Dionysus.

Both cases are themselves rich opportunities for interpretation, particularly regarding how they embody competing schools of philosophy, but I am interested specifically in how they relate to the final case. In the second of the two, Stoa accuses Pleasure of seducing away her lover Dionysus from a temperate, virtuous life to one of careless hedonism; Epicurus speaks on behalf of Pleasure, arguing that since pleasure is preferable to pain, this is naturally what men will choose, and therefore there is no question of seduction in this case. This trial is essentially a debate between Stoicism and Epicureanism; “stoa” (portico) likely refers to the “Stoa Poikile” in

which the Stoic philosopher Zeno of Citium taught. Even on a simple level, however, it presents us with a contrast between a life of virtue won by long, hard toil, and one of easy enjoyment, again bringing up the motif of a choice of two paths found in *Somnium* and *Praeceptor*. Stoa's speech acknowledges that she is not as pretty in appearance as her opponent and that this may be a factor in the jurors' decision:

οὐκ ἄγνοῶ μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ὡς πρὸς εὐπρόσωπόν μοι τὴν ἀντίδικον ὁ λόγος ἔσται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ὁρῶ πρὸς μὲν ἐκείνην ἀποβλέποντας καὶ μειδιῶντας πρὸς αὐτήν, ἐμοῦ δὲ καταφρονοῦντας, ὅτι ἐν χρῶ κέκαρμαι καὶ ἀρρενωπὸν βλέπω καὶ σκυθρωπὴ δοκῶ

I am not unaware, gentlemen of the jury, that the discourse will be in favor of my fair opponent, but in fact I see many of you glancing at her and smiling towards her, despising me, because I am shaven close to the skin and I appear masculine, and I seem sullen-looking (20).

Her implication is that Pleasure's good looks are only superficial, and she is nevertheless the more virtuous choice. This recalls the contrast between Paideia, who was also fair of face (εὐπρόσωπόν), and Techne, who was likewise more manly-looking, as well as the difference between the effeminate and masculine guides in *Praeceptor*. Observing this similarity might also lead us to recall the motif on which the figures in *Somnium* were based, the fable of the choice of Heracles between Vice and Virtue. In fact, it is likely Lucian wants us to be thinking of that reference at this moment, for Stoa later references Heracles: αὐτήν ἐρωτᾶτε, οἷους ἂν οἶεται γενέσθαι τὸν Ἡρακλέα καὶ τὸν ὑμέτερον Θησέα, εἰ προσθέντες τῇ ἡδονῇ ἔφυγον τοὺς πόνους (Ask her, what sort of men does she supposed that Heracles and later Theseus would have been, if taking up with pleasure they had fled their labors) (20). This reminds us of the choice Heracles had to make in Prodicus' fable between an easy life and a hard one, and aligns

the present case with that choice. This suggests that Lucian is reworking the same motif again here, if in a subtler way.

In the *Somnium* this motif was inverted because the “right” choice, Paideia, was the one with the pretty appearance, while Techne was rejected for her ugliness, which is the opposite of how the fable is supposed to work. A similar inversion occurs in this text. Before the defense speaks, we probably assume that Stoa is the “right” choice in the sense that the case will be decided her in favor, not only because of the moral example she has established for herself, but because of how the previous case was decided. Stoa explicitly links her case to the one between Academy and Drunkenness: ἦν γε οἱ πρὸ ὑμῶν δίκην ἐδίκασαν τῇ Ἀκαδημείᾳ καὶ τῇ Μέθῃ, ἀδελφὴ τῆς παρούσης δίκης ἐστίν (the case which they judged before you regarding Academy and Drunkenness, it is the sister of this present case) (20). It makes sense, because the scenario in that case also involved a choice between the respectable, industrious life of philosopher, and the disreputable, freewheeling life of a drunkard. In that trial, the jury affirmed the former by voting in favor of the Academy, but despite Stoa’s bid to associate her case with that verdict, in this one Pleasure wins unanimously. Again the “right” and “wrong” sides seem to have been reversed. Although this reversal of terms is much less significant to *Bis Accusatus* overall than the one in the *Somnium* was, it still fits in with the kind of displacement that Lucian is constantly creating throughout all of the texts we have examined thus far. The easy road is shown to be preferable over the hard; appearance seems to be more important than substance. All of these have the effect of challenging the audience’s assumptions about what it means to have *paideia*. The hints presented in these two trials offer a link outwards to those ideas in the other texts and, more obliquely, to the source from which they all draw. They then invite us to approach the relationship between Rhetoric and the Syrian with these issues in mind.

Thus, the Syrian represents a figure that has successfully made the transformation into a *pepaideumenos*, but with Lucian's constant reminder that this process is not as simple as it seems. It should also remind us that the charge against him may carry more risk than just an offended genre: this upstart foreigner stands accused of casting aside the very agent that gave him any respectable identity at all. In his defense speech, the Syrian never denies that Rhetoric did everything for him that she said she did; however, he argues that Rhetoric, not he, was guilty of bad conduct. After he had lived with her for a while, she changed from a respectable companion to a shameless tart, dolling herself up to please her hordes of admirers:

ἐγὼ γὰρ ὁρῶν ταύτην οὐκέτι σωφρονοῦσαν οὐδὲ μένουσαν ἐπὶ τοῦ κοσμίου σχήματος οἷόν ποτε ἐσχηματισμένην αὐτὴν ὁ Παιανιεὺς ἐκεῖνος ἡγάγετο, κοσμουμένην δὲ καὶ τὰς τρίχας εὐθετίζουσιν εἰς τὸ ἑταιρικὸν καὶ φυκίον ἐντριβομένην καὶ τῶφθαλμῷ ὑπογραφομένην, ὑπώπτειον εὐθὺς καὶ παρεφύλαττον ὅποι τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν φέρει.

Seeing that she was no longer chaste and had not remained in modest fashion of the sort she had worn when that Paianius [Demosthenes] led her, but was well-arrayed and thrice done-up in the manner of a courtesan, and had rubbed in rouge and painted under her eyes, I at once became suspicious and guarded where she turned her gaze (31).

The Syrian did not want to deal with her in this new state, so he escaped to live with Dialogue, who in any case is a much better fit for a man getting on in years, as he is now (32). In other words, he seems to be saying, the circumstances surrounding his *paideia* have changed in a way that makes a shift in his path the appropriate course of action. His plea is apparently convincing, for he wins all but one of the jurors' votes. The nature of the Syrian's defense fits into the larger context of the piece and its defense of *paideia* for essentially the same reason: it implies that the practice of rhetoric itself has changed and therefore it may make sense for one practicing it to

adjust accordingly. The focus on Rhetoric's new habit of arranging and beautifying her appearance (κοσμουμένην... ὑπογραφομένην) returns to the persistent theme of dress and physical appearance, and suggests a logical extension of a kind of *paideia* that is overly concerned with those matters alone. Perhaps more notably, the Syrian suggests that Rhetoric has degenerated; she is not like she was in the time of Demosthenes, even though she tried to imitate him in the opening lines of her speech. This evokes a gap between past and present reminiscent of the one discussed in relation to *Rhetorum Praeceptor*. Again Lucian reminds us that it is no longer possible to truly be like the orators of the classical era, and perhaps a true *pepaideumenos* is one who does not continue to pretend that nothing has changed. He acknowledges a break with tradition, but shifts the terms of debate so that his audience will have to reconsider what it really means to break with precedent in the way that he has.

Lucian continues to develop this method of defense in the second accusation against the Syrian, brought by Dialogue, in which he must justify not only having broken with tradition but altering it in unusual ways. Dialogue alleges that he was once a serious and solemn art, concerned with lofty matters of philosophy, but when the Syrian came to live with him, he dragged him down to the level of the masses, mixing him with comedy and other genres until he became a ridiculous-looking hybrid, a literary “hippocentaur”: κρᾶσίν τινα παράδοξον κέκραμαι καὶ οὔτε πεζός εἰμι οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν μέτρων βέβηκα, ἀλλὰ ἵπποκενταύρου δίκην σύνθετόν τι καὶ ξένον φάσμα τοῖς ἀκούουσι δοκῶ (I have been blended into some paradoxical mixture and I am neither afoot nor do I ride upon verses, but in the manner of a hippocentaur I seem some composite and foreign monster to those listening) (33). For this, the Syrian is guilty of serious insult (ὕβρις). These charges return to the problem of strangeness and newness that arose when the Syrian's trial was first announced. Here these qualities have been created by a

mash-up of disparate elements, which Dialogue emphasizes with the visual image of the centaur, half-man, half-horse, and the mixed metaphor that introduces it. The phrase, οὔτε πεζός εἰμι οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν μέτρων βέβηκα, which I translate as “I am neither afoot nor do I ride upon verses” in an attempt to capture the metaphor, actually signifies two contrasts: one between walking (πεζός, on foot) and riding (βέβηκα) on horseback, which is suitable for the centaur image; and the other between prose (an alternate meaning of πεζός) and poetry (τῶν μέτρων, verses). The language itself encapsulates the incomprehensibility that the mixing of genres has produced; even to describe or categorize it has become problematic. Moreover, the issue of identity is still at stake: the Syrian has made Dialogue seem “ξένον” (foreign or strange), the same word used earlier in reference to the Syrian himself (καινήν καὶ ξένην) (25). This meddling with tradition is particularly troublesome because the one doing it is himself a strange hybrid, a barbarian who speaks Greek, and an outsider who became a member of elite society through his *paideia*.

Despite his problematic position, the Syrian again defends himself not by denying the charges but by arguing that his actions were beneficial to Dialogue rather than insulting. Dialogue was dull and stuffy, he says, and by taking him down from his lofty perch and sprucing him up with bits of comedy, he made him more appealing to people (34). The Syrian’s defense speech again sways the jury in his favor, yet his arguments alone do not seem to be sufficient to tackle the potential threats of foreignness and paradox that his presence has raised. Moreover, at the end of his speech, he asserts:

τῶν γε ἄλλων ἔνεκα οὐκ ἂν οἶμαι μέμψαιτό μοι, ὥς θοιμάτιον τοῦτο τὸ
Ἑλληνικὸν περισπᾶσας αὐτοῦ βαρβαρικόν τι μετενέδυσα, καὶ ταῦτα βάρβαρος
αὐτὸς εἶναι δοκῶν. ἡδίκουν γὰρ ἂν τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς αὐτὸν παρανομῶν καὶ τὴν
πάτριον ἐσθῆτα λωποδυτῶν

I don't suppose he could reproach me on account of the other matters, that I took off his Greek clothes and dressed him in some barbarian manner, even though I myself seem to be barbarian with respect to those things. I would be unjust to do such unlawful things towards him, and steal his native clothes (34).

The Syrian acknowledges the potential threat of his foreignness that is implicit in the charges against him; he knows that he seems foreign himself. Yet he denies that this is a problem here, and in fact he would be in the wrong if it was. He frames all of this in terms of clothing and appearance, highly charged themes in Lucian's treatment of *paideia*. In itself it does not sound like a particularly reassuring defense, and possibly contradictory: if the Syrian looks alien enough that he must justify his presence, how did he leave Dialogue essentially untouched? Only by bringing it together with Lucian's overarching strategy can we begin to understand how the Syrian can spin a charge of tampering with tradition into a noteworthy accomplishment.

If for Rhetoric the historical precedent that Lucian alludes to is Demosthenes, with Dialogue he is clearly echoing Plato. Dialogue begins his speech with self-effacing language that recalls the *Apology* of Socrates; the rest of his speech is laden with quotes from the *Phaedrus* (246e). Other philosophical schools may have been featured in the earlier cases, but evidently we are to picture Plato as the highest standard for philosophical dialogue. The Syrian, then, is claiming to have "modernized" Plato in a humorous, appealing manner. Dialogue would argue that this amounts to an outlandish travesty of a literary and philosophical ideal, but perhaps, as we have seen, things are never quite as simple as they seem. Lucian was clearly well-read in Plato and makes frequent references to him in his works, if less so in the ones that this paper focuses on.⁴⁵ R. Bracht Branham has argued that there are, in fact, important precedents for Lucian's comic dialogues in Plato's own dialogues, and that Lucian uses similar techniques and concepts to achieve his own ends. Branham gives the example of the *Euthydemus*, in which Plato

⁴⁵ Householder 1941, 62.

uses a satirical representation of sophists to contrast them with Socratic discourse, by highlighting a gap between the sophists' artificial use of language and the reality it describes.⁴⁶ Branham argues that Lucian employs a similar strategy in dialogues, such as *Anacharsis*, that bring together wildly disparate characters from myth and history. These encounters are humorous because of a language gap, not between an ideal and representations of its opponents, but between two characters who cannot correctly interpret what the other is talking about.⁴⁷ The point is that all of these characters are available to Lucian in the literary and mythic context from which he draws; likewise, the full range of philosophical schools, literary genres, and schools of thought that are given voice and represented by these characters is also available to an author in the Second Sophistic.⁴⁸ By humorously juxtaposing them, Lucian forces his audience to view these elements of tradition in a different light.

Although not included in Branham's analysis, *Bis Accusatus*, and specifically the Syrian's treatment of Dialogue, which can be seen as a metaphor for Lucian's own literary technique, are relevant here. The Syrian's new, improved version of philosophical dialogue may contain a bizarre mix of comedy and Platonic discourse, but all of these are now part of the tradition that has come down to him through *paideia*, far removed from their original separate contexts, and now they can exist side by side. In fact, a blending of genres may be the most logical response to this present reality, and a more legitimate engagement with literary tradition. The Syrian's bizarre "hippocentaur" is threatening because it requires his audience to reconsider traditional boundaries between genres, but perhaps he is only showing them how strange their world really is. He does this, according to Branham's analysis, by adapting techniques from within the tradition of philosophical dialogue that was handed down to him from Plato, to create

⁴⁶ Branham 1989, 73-80.

⁴⁷ Branham 1989, 81-2.

⁴⁸ Branham 1989, 82.

a new style that fits his present circumstances more suitably than mere imitation would have.

Despite appearing to be an outsider, he aims to prove himself a legitimate part of the established tradition, while at the same time seeking to innovate within that tradition.

I think that if we view the defense of the Syrian's *paideia* in terms of the tension between tradition and innovation, many other aspects of it begin to fall into place. On the one hand, the entire idea of *paideia* depends upon an unbroken connection between a Greek cultural ideal of the past and the *pepaideumenos* who embodies it through conscious imitation. To be a legitimate *pepaideumenos*, the Syrian needs to place himself within that lineage; he admits himself that it would be wrong of him to change Greek Dialogue into foreign clothes. However, he is aware, and makes his audience aware, that this ideal of *paideia* does not necessarily coincide with its reality. We are no longer in the time of Demosthenes and Plato, and in a new political situation the purpose and uses of both rhetoric and philosophy may have changed. We are also reminded that what has come to encompass *paideia* is a "disconcerting babel of incompatible traditions" to which any author of the present time has access, and therefore a claim to a pure, unbroken tradition is more difficult to make.⁴⁹ In response to these circumstances, the Syrian seems to suggest, it is better not to try to merely imitate the *ἑωλα παραδείγματα*, stale examples, of the old masters, but to do something *μη ἑωλον*, by following these examples to create one's own original inventions that aim to be as good as those that came before them; this is, essentially, a more authentic kind of imitation. It is by virtue of his innovation that he merits a place within the tradition.

This conception of the author's role as an innovator of tradition also offers a slightly different angle with which to interpret the Syrian's role as an outsider. Since it has such a central

⁴⁹ Branham 1989, 82.

presence in the piece, and especially given that the Syrian himself acknowledges his foreign appearance, it seems likely that the audience is supposed to picture this character as someone who despite his Greek *paideia* still appears different, whether in some accent of speech or peculiarity of appearance. The Syrian is either unable or unwilling to fully assimilate. And because we have linked Lucian as an author to this persona, it seems reasonable to speculate that Lucian also appeared foreign in a similar way, and therefore needed to defend his position in Greek society through the representation of this trial. I would like to suggest, however, that the emphasis on the outsider has additional significance as a rhetorical construction that interplays with the figure of the innovator. Part of this construction relates back to the character of Pan, who, as I explain above, is used to set up our expectations of the Syrian. As an outsider living so near the center, Pan proves to have a unique perspective on the insiders around him. When he converses with Hermes and Justice, they address the topic of the many philosophers who are now wandering around Athens sporting characteristic beards and cloaks. Although he confesses himself an uneducated observer, Pan is critical of these so-called philosophers, most of which seem to do little more than see who can shout the loudest:

διαταράξαντες γοῦν τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπισκοπούμενον συγχέαντες
 ἀπίασι λοιδορησάμενοι ἀλλήλοις οἱ πολλοί, τὸν ἰδρῶτα ἐκ τοῦ μετώπου ἀγκύλῳ
 τῷ δακτύλῳ ἀποξυόμενοι, καὶ οὗτος κρατεῖν ἔδοξεν ὃς ἂν μεγαλοφωνότερος
 αὐτῶν ᾗ

Mixing up their discourses and jumbling from the start the matter that has been considered, many of them go about abusing one another, wiping sweating from their foreheads with a bent finger, and the one who is the loudest of voice seems to win out (11).

The absurdity of all these people claiming to be philosophers is evident to Pan precisely because he lacks any context for understanding them: it all just sounds like shouting to him. By viewing the situation through his eyes we are also encouraged to see it as absurd. The outsider thus has a clearer perspective on how things really are. I think that once we have seen Pan presented as having this insight because of his position, we are encouraged to see the Syrian as an outsider whose unique position also allows him a more accurate perspective on the reality of his time and place. The audience is forced to consider that there might be some advantage in being foreign.

If his status as an outsider is what allows the Syrian to observe the gap between past and present that *Bis Accusatus* has exposed for its audience, it may also be what led him to choose to engage with *paideia* through his peculiar balance of innovation and tradition. If he appears foreign in some obvious way, perhaps he can never truly gain acceptance by pretending to be a Greek orator or philosopher, and therefore it is better to position himself as a figure who is linked to tradition in a different way. In either case he will seem strange to a Greek audience, but this way he has more control over how that strangeness is expressed. Or to approach from a different angle, perhaps there are advantages to representing oneself as an outsider if you happen to be producing literary works that your audiences find unusual and shocking. If we align the Syrian with Lucian as an author, this shows how Lucian is brilliantly playing his self-representation as both foreigner and innovator to his own advantage. Ethnicity codes his innovation, and vice versa. It is not that Lucian was necessarily compelled to develop his own literary style because he was an outsider, or that he merely chose to represent himself as an outsider in order to innovate; rather, both of those possibilities are reflected in *Bis Accusatus* in a way that makes aspects of Lucian's self-representation that could be very threatening instead lead to his acquittal.

If the audience is attuned to the many clever twists of Lucian's piece, by the end of *Bis Accusatus* they should be disposed to agree with the Syrian's defense, if only because he has made any further arguments against him difficult to maintain. One final element of the Syrian's last speech remains to be addressed. As I already noted, the Syrian frames his transformation of Dialogue in terms of changing clothes, which was symbolic of changing ethnic identity: οὐκ ἂν οἶμαι μέμψαιτό μοι, ὥς θοῖμάτιον τοῦτο τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν περισπάσας αὐτοῦ βαρβαρικὸν τι μετενέδυσσας (I don't suppose he could reproach me, that I took off his Greek clothes and dressed him in some barbarian manner) (34). This is a curious metaphor to use, for although ethnicity is frequently marked by clothing, clothes in themselves do not determine ethnicity: a superficial metaphor for an inherent identity. It does, however, recall the other places in this text, as well as in the other works I have examined, when a change in or pronouncement of identity is marked by a change of appearance. The speaker of the *Somnium* put on purple clothing to become a *pepaideumenos*; the effeminate guide in *Rhetorum Praeceptor* advised his pupil on what to wear in order to look like an orator. In both cases the superficiality of clothing was an indication of how these identities were or might be pretended.

As the Syrian's metaphor suggests, however, clothing in *Bis Accusatus* seems to have a less straightforward set of associations. On the one hand, there are places in the text where the disjunction between appearance and inner identity are clearly important. All the false philosophers running about Athens that so irritate Pan are said to have a characteristic costume of a threadbare cloak, staff, and leather wallet (τριβῶνες καὶ βακτηρίαι καὶ πήραι)(6), yet the gods acknowledge that many who wear these clothes do not actually live up to the name of philosopher (7). On the other hand, both the decline of Rhetoric and the Syrian's transformation of Dialogue are framed in terms of changes in appearance which are clearly meant to reflect a

real change in character. Rhetoric, as noted above, began dressing up and putting on make-up (31), changes which, although they indicate her new interest in more superficial matters, are nevertheless presumably aligned with what she really has become. The Syrian also explains how he took Dialogue, who still seemed sullen-looking to most people (σκυθρωπὸν ἔτι τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκοῦντα), and made him more pleasing to audiences by washing away his squalor (τὸν αὐχμὸν τὸν πολὺν ἀποπλύνας) and putting a smile on his face (μειδιᾶν καταναγκάσας) (34). This too is a superficial change, but it is integrated with real alterations to his style and content, and is presented as a positive part of the Syrian's defense. Both of these examples suggest that perhaps there are times when a change in clothing does correspond to a legitimate change in identity. Yet how are we to know when this is true and when it is not?

I think that, as is often the case with Lucian's texts, the ambiguity is the point. Clothing is allowed to have different meanings as it suits the author's purpose for each scenario, and both functions come together in his defense. If clothes are only superficial, then linking them to ethnicity is a way of minimizing how threatening the Syrian's ethnicity seems: he may *look* foreign, but only on the outside; inside he is a true *pepaideumenos*. Conversely, if clothing is an authentic identity marker, then by associating it with *paideia* the author is able to legitimize his status as *pepaideumenos*. The Syrian may be a foreigner, but as he reassures us in his final speech, "his outlandish dialogues are clothed in native Greek attire."⁵⁰ What is fraudulent in one context becomes a conveniently visible signifier in another, but either way the effect is the same, because Lucian is able to play both possibilities to his advantage. If his audience is perplexed by these tricks of multiple meanings, so much the better, for it allows the author to maintain the

⁵⁰ Branham 1989, 37.

upper hand. Perhaps *paideia* is nothing more than a purple-bordered robe, but it is one that Lucian masterfully wears.

Conclusion

Paideia is an important theme in *Somnium*, *Rhetorum Praeceptor*, and *Bis Accusatus*, and all three works explore different facets of it which do not necessarily lead to the same conclusion. Even within each piece, Lucian plays with contradictory ideas and shifting points of reference in ways that are often bewildering for his reader. The logical progression of the three texts takes us through the career of a *pepaideumenos* from the moment he chooses to pursue *paideia*, as he takes the steps (literally and figuratively) towards mastery of rhetoric, to finally later his career when the fruits of his work are put on trial. *Somnium* crafts a satire of *paideia* that manages also to be a brilliant display of the author's own *paideia*. *Rhetorum Praeceptor* is also a satire that turns in on itself as it exposes the performative nature of oratory and the gap between past and present that *paideia* attempts to bridge. *Bis Accusatus* constructs a defense for an outsider and newcomer that both disrupts and upholds the traditional nature of *paideia*. All three works rely on challenging or displacing assumptions of an internal or external audience about *paideia* and those who profess to have it. None of them offers a single, definitive assertion of what the role of *paideia* is or should be, and indeed more often there seem to be multiple layers of meaning within one text. This suggests a constant give and take between Lucian and his surroundings that is reflected in the composition and performance of his works.

One motif that all of these texts do have in common is clothing and its relationship to identity, particularly the identity created by *paideia*. This persistent connection between clothing and *paideia* is also persistently problematic in various ways. In *Somnium* clothing was one of the ornamenting assets offered by *Paideia*, and the speaker changed into new, fancy clothes when he became a *pepaideumenos*. This raised the troubling possibility that *paideia* might signify only superficial outward adornment. However, this suggestion ultimately proved to be contained

within the author's mastery of *paideia* and its implications in a society where the status of *pepaideumenos* was marked by self-presentation. Clothing in *Rhetorum Praeceptor* also symbolized an attention to outward appearance at the detriment of substance, when it invited the audience to laugh at the effeminate guide who imagined that fancy clothes and a purple stripe on his cloak would make him appear an orator. But this too became complicated throughout the text as it was revealed that the superficiality and the imitative quality of the "false" orator were problematic for the "real" one also. *Bis Accusatus*, on the other hand, incorporated examples of clothing as both a false and authentic marker of identity in ways that worked in favor of the author's representation of his persona. By emphasizing a connection between clothes and ethnicity, he minimizes his ethnicity; by making that same connection with *paideia*, he simultaneously legitimizes his *paideia*.

In each text the question of whether or not clothing should be taken as a mark of authentic identity remains ambiguous at best. More often Lucian seems to be playing with both sides, simultaneously proposing clothes can be a cover for a fraudulent identity and the sign of a real one. I think that through this he is suggesting that *paideia* is like a costume that allows someone to play a certain role. That role may or may not be a "real" identity, but for the purpose of performance this is beside the point. Lucian takes advantage of the costume-like nature of *paideia* by playing many different roles throughout his texts, refusing to be trapped in any one voice or guise. If those roles sometimes seem contradictory or irreconcilable, that is not his concern, as long as the performance suits his purpose in a particular situation. He can suggest, on the one hand, that *paideia* is a superficial identity marked by outward display, or that the past is impossibly separated from the present; yet at the same time, he is still able to utilize *paideia* and its canon to legitimize his literary creations. I think that there are points at which Lucian wants

his audience to be aware that they are seeing a mask and to grapple, as I have done here, with questions of authenticity and representation. Ultimately, however, the key point is that Lucian proves himself capable of the performance of *paideia*, and it is in this performance that authenticity, or at least legitimization, lies. In other words, the question is not really whether or not he, or anyone else, truly is as he appears to be, but how skillfully he plays the role that he has chosen, and Lucian clearly shows that he is a master of role-playing.

Finally, there is one question prompted by all three texts which should be addressed, even though it is no more easily answered. To what extent does *paideia* enable social mobility? At the end of the first chapter, I noted that *Somnium* had raised this issue because of its depiction of a youth rising from relatively modest means to a lofty status. Although this piece suggests that this is indeed possible, it was difficult to determine what the nature of such a transformation might be, because the terms by which we would interpret it had been made problematic through the satirizing of *paideia*. *Rhetorum Praeceptor* also implies that *paideia* confers a change of social status: once he has completed his journey and married Rhetoric, the aspiring youth will gain not only fame but material wealth from his union. However, in this piece also the focus is shifted from the actual result of this process to the ways in which it can be vulnerable to de-legitimization. We are not so sure, in the end, if Rhetoric's dowry is worth having or not. And although the ultimate defense of *Bis Accusatus* rests upon the assumption that a foreign nobody can become a *pepaideumenos*, simply the fact that this defense should be thought necessary raises a hint of doubt about the effectiveness of such a transformation.

In all three works there is a pattern by which this issue is raised but then elided by or merged with other concerns. Perhaps this suggests that while *paideia* does create social mobility, it is always fraught with complication and open to suspicion. However, I think it may be more

likely that, like the concern over the authenticity of clothing, this question too is misplaced. That is, although Lucian is aware that *paideia* has such power, and indeed relies on the fact that it does, it is not what he chooses to emphasize. Instead he focuses on *paideia* as a performance, placing the changing of social position within the framework of changing performance roles. In that context any transformation is possible if the performer has the means to construct it, as Lucian manages to do for his own personas in these texts. I think that Lucian is less concerned with whether *paideia* in general might allow someone to rise from a marginalized position to a lofty one, than whether he is able to represent himself as having done so successfully.

In this, as always, Lucian manages to get the last laugh, for his texts themselves are proof that this representation has been successful. If in his own time he was an outsider who needed to defend his *paideia*, as he would have us believe, he now merits a place in the modern definition of “classical” literature. As Paideia asserts in *Somnium*: ἤν αὐτὸς ἐκ τοῦ βίου ἀπέλθῃς, οὐποτε παύσῃ συνὼν τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις; even if you yourself depart from life, you never cease to be among the *pepaideumenoι* (12). Like the narrator through whom he speaks in that piece, Lucian gained a voice by his *paideia*, and it is a voice that we can still hear. In this he has never ceased to be among the *pepaideumenoι*.

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